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Burdens of Pleading and Proof in
Discrimination Cases: Toward a
Theory of Procedural Justice
Robert Belton*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has a host of federal laws that prohibit dis-
crimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, age, handicap, na-
tional origin, and veteran's preference; these laws encompass a
broad range of activities that include employment, education,
housing, voting, and public accommodation.1 Until recently, courts
* Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law. B.A., 1961, Univer-
sity of Connecticut; J.D., 1965, Boston University School of Law. I express my appreciation
to Kimberly Jennings Dean and Betsy Gale Shain for their research assistance on this
Article.
1. See, e.g., Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691e (1976); Equal Pay
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-
634 (1976 & Supp. I1 1979); State and Local Financial Assistance Act (Revenue Sharing
Act of 1972), 31 U.S.C. § 1242(a) (1976); Civil Rights Acts of 1870 and 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§
1981, 1982, 1983 (1976); Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1976
& Supp. II 1978) (public accommodations); Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VI, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000d to 2000d-4 (1976 & Supp. H 1978) (federally funded programs); Civil Rights Act of
1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. H 1978) (employment) [herein-
after referred to as Title VII]; Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1976). See
generally Larson, Discrimination as a Field of Law, 18 WAsHBURN L.J. 413 (1979) (arguing
that the time has come to consider discrimination as a separate field of law).
Federal civil rights litigation-especially discrimination cases-has increased phenome-
nally since 1965. During the past decade, for example, the total civil caseload increased
100%-from 77,193 cases in fiscal 1969 to 154,666 cases in fiscal 1979. Civil rights cases, on
the other hand, which are broadly defined as actions arising under any civil rights statute,
increased 431% in the same period, easily outpacing the aggregate rise in civil filings. Com-
pare Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
117,120 (1969) with Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts 4, 60 (1979). Among the catalysts that sparked this spate of litigation
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and commentators have focused their attention primarily on the
development of substantive theories of liability and remedies for
proven violations.' They have expended extraordinarily little ef-
fort, however, on the development of a coherent framework for al-
locating the burdens of proof' in discrimination cases.4 The failure
were the Supreme Court's "revitalization" of the Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1982 (1976), the comprehensive civil rights legislation of the 1960's, particularly Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. H 1978), and the
development of strict scrutiny equal protection analysis, see Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S.
385 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). See generally Belton, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964: A Decade of Private Enforcement and Judicial Developments, 20 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 225 (1976).
2. See Belton, Discrimination and Affirmative Action: An Analysis of Competing
Theories of Discrimination and Weber, 59 N.C. L. Rav. 531, 537 & n.28 (1981).
3. The term "burden of proof" has two independent meanings. On the one hand, it is
used to denote the degree to which a factfinder must be subjectively persuaded-based
upon the evidence presented-that a particular fact is more likely true than not. See, e.g.,
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958) (beyond a reasonable doubt); Hobson v.
Eaton, 399 F.2d 781, 784-85 (6th Cir. 1968) (clear and convincing), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
928 (1969); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 7.5-.8 (2d ed. 1977); C. MCCORMICK,
McCORMIcK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE §§ 336-341 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972); 9 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2497-2498 (Chadbourn rev. 1981); Kaplan, Decision Theory and the
Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REv. 1065 (1968); McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of
Belief, 32 CALI. L. REv. 242 (1944); McNaughton, Burden of Production of Evidence: A
Function of a Burden of Persuasion, 68 HARv. L. REV. 1382 (1955). On the other hand, the
term may refer to the duty of a party to come forward with evidence to prove a particular
fact. This duty initially is allocated to the party seeking a change in the status quo, usually
the plaintiff in a civil case or the prosecutor in a criminal case. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958); Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117-19 (1943); M. GREEN, BASIC
CIVIm PROCEDURE 110-11 (2d ed. 1979); C. MCCORMICK, supra, § 338; 9 J. WIGMORE, supra,
§§ 2487-2489. Unless otherwise specified, this Article uses the term "burden of proof" to
mean a degree of persuasion. The term "burdens of proof," however, will typically be used
to refer to both the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion, though it
may also include the burden of pleading.
4. For a recent article that considers one aspect of the burdens of proof in disparate
treatment discrimination cases, see Mendez, Presumptions of Discriminatory Motive in Ti-
tle VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1129 (1980). Other commentators
have considered the burden of proof question in these cases, but have not attempted to
provide a framework for analyzing the subject in a coherent fashion. See, e.g., 2 A. LARSON,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw §§ 50.00-.40 (1978) (employment discrimination); C. SuL-
LIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARD, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
67-69 (1980) (employment discrimination); Friedman, Congress, The Courts, and Sex-Based
Employment Discrimination in Higher Education: A Tale of Two Titles, 34 VAND. L. REv.
37, 51-54 (1981) (employment discrimination); Friedman, The Burger Court and the Prima
Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Litigation: A Critique, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 1
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Critique]; Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to
Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J.
447, 463-64 (1978) (actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Smith & Leggette, Recent Issues in
Litigation Under the Age Discrimination Act, 41 Omo ST. L.J. 349, 369-80 (1980) (age dis-
crimination). See also B. ScHLER & P. GROsSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw, ch. 36,
at 306-16 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
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of the courts to formulate a coherent framework for allocating bur-
dens of proof is a major defect in the enforcement of laws prohibit-
ing discrimination, since the allocation of the burdens of proof dur-
ing trial often has a significant effect on the outcome of a case and
frequently may be dispositive.5 Indeed, the concept of a burden of
proof is one of the most important procedural notions in our legal
system; it helps implement the substantive laws by instructing the
factfinder on the degree of confidence he should have in the cor-
rectness of factual conclusions for a particular type of case.6
Burdens of proof govern the process of factfinding,7 and a fac-
tual dispute is at the heart of virtually every discrimination case.
Upon the conclusion of a trial at which evidence is presented, the
factfinder-either a judge or a jurys-must make a decision. The
factfinder is not, however, left simply to his own devices in receiv-
ing notice, collecting evidence, and determining how, when, and by
whom the evidence should be presented. Instead, the courts and
legislatures have developed a substantial array of procedural rules
that the factfinder must consider and administer in the decision-
making process. Among the most important of these rules are the
ones that allocate the burdens of pleading, producing evidence,
and persuasion, the last of which encompasses degrees of persua-
sion as well. The burden of pleading refers to the process of notify-
ing the factfinder about the nature of the dispute between the par-
ties. The burden of persuasion contains the dual elements of
location and weight: the location specifies the party who will lose if
the burden is not met, and the weight specifies how persuasive the
evidence must be to sustain this burden. The burden of production
determines the timing of the presentation of the evidence and like-
5. Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 585 (1976); Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 758
(1st Cir. 1940); see Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 235, 270-71
(1971).
6. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
7. See id. at 423, 427.
8. Some discrimination cases must be tried before a jury. See, e.g., Lorillard v. Pons,
434 U.S. 575 (1978) (right to jury trial under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976)); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) (defendant in housing
discrimination case under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631
(1970), entitled to jury trial). Others are tried before the court sitting without a jury. See,
e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 436 (1975) (no right to jury trial under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970)). It is un-
clear whether there is a right to a jury trial under the civil rights legislation enacted during
Reconstruction. See, e.g., Civil Rights Acts of 1870 and 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983
(1976).
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wise has two important features: "[F]irst, like . . . the burden of
persuasion, it provides that when the evidence is inadequate, the
party with the burden loses; second, unlike... the burden of per-
suasion, it operates in a jury trial to remove the issue from the
jury. When the burden of producing evidence is not satisfied, the
judge resolves the issue.""
Discrimination cases generally are considered to be civil ac-
tions in which the plaintiff must establish his claim for relief by
the preponderance of the evidence standard. 10 Despite this well-
established rule, however, courts disagree on how the burdens of
pleading and proof should be allocated between plaintiffs and de-
fendants to determine discrimination vel non."' The Supreme
Court has been presented with several opportunities to formulate a
coherent framework for allocating burdens in discrimination cases;
9. See Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in
Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1300 n.3 (1977).
10. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977). The usual formulation of
the standard in civil cases is that there must be a preponderance of evidence in favor of the
party having the burden of persuasion before he is entitled to a decision in his favor. F.
JAmEs & G. HAZARD, supra note 3, § 7.6, at 243.
11. See, e.g., Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251 (6th Cir. 1981)
(Title VID; Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 866 (9th Cir. 1981)
(Title VII); Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1981) (voting); Holder v. Old Ben Coal
Co., 618 F.2d 1198 (7th Cir. 1980) (Title VII); Marshall v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 576
F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1978) (age); Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561 (8th
Cir. 1977) (age); Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976) (age). Cf.
Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980) (claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983) (question left unde-
cided). This disagreement is also reflected in the commentary on the attempts by the Su-
preme Court to provide a coherent framework for this problem. Professor Larson, for exam-
ple, interpreted McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), "as ... the vehicle for
the promulgation of a general rule designed to bring order out of a chaotic situation that
had developed within the circuits and districts." 2 A. LARSON, supra note 4, § 50.10, at 10-
144. Professor Larson concludes that the decision in McDonnell Douglas was a conscious
effort by the Court "to construct a general working formula designed to rationalize a seg-
ment of this boisterous field of law." Id. Professor Mendez, on the other hand, relying on
some of the same cases as Professor Larson, concludes that in each instance in which the
Court has attempted to define the burdens of proof for the parties in a disparate treatment
discrimination case, "the Court has failed to achieve a clear definition." Mendez, supra note
4, at 1130. See also Friedman, Critique, supra note 4.
Part of the confusion over the term "burden of proof" results from the insensitivity of
courts to the distinction between the burden of persuasion and the burden of producing
evidence. Under Roman law, the courts separately heard plaintiffs' and defendants' cases;
thus, since each time segment contained one clear affirmation, the term "burden of proof"
had a simple meaning. See J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COM-
MON LAW 364-66 (1898). Common law combined the issues by a plea of confession and
avoidance and tried all issues together; that procedure led to the confusion between the
burden of production to rebut an opponent's case and the burden of persuasion to prove
one's own case. See id. at 355-64.
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unfortunately, however, its efforts to date have contributed to
rather than clarified the confusion in this area.12 The Court has
established different rules for allocating the burdens of pleading
and proof under the several substantive theories of discrimination,
but it has never attempted to articulate a rationale for these differ-
ent approaches. Recently, in Texas Department of Community Af-
fairs v. Burdine,13 the Court attempted to clarify some of the con-
fusion that its earlier cases had generated. Unfortunately, even
though it is a unanimous opinion, Burdine fails to achieve this re-
sult because the Court decided the case without extensive analysis.
A review of the discrimination cases also suggests that the
burden of proof issue may well be the battleground upon which
some judges are attempting to repudiate the disparate impact the-
ory of discrimination.14 A court may be hesitant to repudiate out-
right well-established substantive theories of liability, even when
there is a belief that these theories are misguided. As a result, a
court instead may adopt procedural rules designed to achieve ef-
fectively the same result.15 One such procedural device that courts
12. See Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978) and
notes 141-46 infra and accompanying text; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405
(1975) and notes 130-32 infra and accompanying text; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973) and notes 126-29 infra and accompanying text; Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) and notes 90-95 infra and accompanying text.
13. 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981).
14. See Belton, supra note 2, at 554 n.105. The disparate impact theory of discrimina-
tion provides that facially neutral practices which have an adverse impact on the opportuni-
ties of members of a protected class are illegal irrespective of any specific intent to create
that impact, unless the practice is mandated by business necessity or has a manifest rela-
tionship to some legitimate interest of the defendant. See notes 90-95 infra and accompany-
ing text.
15. Justice Douglas once observed,
It is sometimes thought to be astute political management of a shift in position to
proclaim that no change is underway. That is designed as a sedative to instill confi-
dence and allay doubts .... Precedents, though distinguished and qualified out of ex-
istence, apparently have been kept alive. The theory is that the outward appearance of
stability is what is important.
... But the more blunt, open, and direct course is truer to the democratic tradi-
tions .... A judiciary that discloses what it is doing and why it does it will breed
understanding. And confidence based on understanding is more enduring than confi-
dence based on awe.
Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 735, 754 (1949). An example of the observation
made by Justice Douglas can be found in Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980), in which
the Court used a definition/application dichotomy in determining the scope of congressional
power to enact a burden of proof standard different from the one adopted by a prior Court
decision. In an earlier case the Court had interpreted the fourteenth amendment to require
that an "intent to relinquish citizenship, whether the intent is expressed in words or is
found as a fair inference from proven conduct" be shown before Congress stripped a person
of citizenship. Id. at 260 (referring to Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967)). A later
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often use to limit the reach of substantive theories is to allocate
the burdens of pleading and proof on the various elements of a
claim for relief in a way that will favor a desired outcome. While
this approach may produce a just decision in the particular case
under consideration, however, it more often than not also produces
confusing language and strained reasoning, which in turn results in
considerable disharmony in subsequent judicial treatment of bur-
den of proof issues.16 Moreover, such an approach often thwarts
the judicial goal of rendering fair and just decisions.
If the national policy of eliminating discrimination is to be
achieved, the courts-to whom the major responsibility for effectu-
ating this goal is delegated-must establish a coherent framework
for allocating the burdens of pleading and proof that provides "a
decision, based on the Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 401(c), 54 Stat. 1168, and not
"rooted in the Constitution," held the burden of proof standard to be a "clear, convincing,
and unequivocal" showing of the requisite intent. Id. at 264-65 n.8 (referring to Nishikawa
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 138 (1958)). The Court upheld the amendment in Vance on the
ground that "since Congress has the express power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment,
it is untenable to hold that it has no power whatsoever to address itself to the manner or
means by which Fourteenth Amendment citizenship may be relinquished." Id. at 266. The
Court distinguished its earlier constitutional holding that conditioned expatriation on intent
from its earlier statutory holding, stating that the latter, in effect, usurped the "traditional
powers of Congress to prescribe rules of evidence and standards of proof in federal courts."
Id. at 265. The Court thus deferred to a "congressional judgment... that the preponder-
ance standard of proof provides sufficient protection for the interest of the individual in
retaining his citizenship." Id. at 266-67. The Court did not budge, however, on the constitu-
tionally imposed intent requirement; instead, it used the requirement as a counterbalance to
the lowered evidentiary burden. The Court did not seem to realize that either intent is not
an evidentiary standard-an unlikely proposition-or that the constitutional definition
blocked any inconsistent congressional standard. See also C. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF CODE PLEADING 609-610 (2d ed. 1947); F. JAsgs & G. HAzARD, supra note 3, § 7.8, at 252.
16. The concept of burden of proof is more than just a formal technique of persuasion.
The Court has noted recently that
[w]e probably can assume no more than that the difference between a preponderance
of the evidence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt probably is better understood
than either of them in relation to the intermediate standard of clear and convincing.
Nonetheless, even if the particular standard-of-proof catchwords do not always make a
great difference in a particular case, adopting a "standard of proof is more than an
empty semantic exercise." In cases involving individual rights, whether criminal or
civil, " [t]he standard of proof [at a minimum] reflects the value society places on
individual liberties."
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1978) (citing Tippet v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153,
1166 (4th Cir. 1971) (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. dismissed
sub nom. Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355 (1972)). Terms such as
"standard of proof" and "prima facie case" refer to procedural and evidentiary issues, but
they also strike at the heart of substantive constitutional and statutory proscriptions. See
Heiser, Intent v. Impact: The Standard of Proof Necessary to Establish a Prima Facie




sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common
experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination."' 7
The purpose of this Article, therefore, is to propose such a coher-
ent approach to the allocation of the burdens of pleading and proof
in discrimination cases. Towards this end, part II of the Article
examines the definitional and operational effect of the terms and
concepts that courts traditionally use to allocate burdens, since a
clear understanding of both the problem and the analytical frame-
work suggested herein requires familiarity with the semantics of
the burden of proof concepts. Part III then identifies the problem
and its sources and considers the statutory as well as the constitu-
tional substantive discrimination theories enunciated by the Su-
preme Court.
Part IV of the Article discusses the basic propositions for the
suggested approach, and part V explores the procedural and public
policy reasons for their adoption. It may be helpful, however, to
briefly state these propositions at the outset. First, the courts
should adopt a "but for" rule on the element of causation and ap-
ply it consistently. 18 Second, in the pleading stage of a case, the
plaintiff should have the burden of pleading a discrimination claim
pursuant to rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."'
Third, if the defendant asserts an independent ground of justifica-
tion-whether based upon a specific statutory exception or a judi-
cially created defense-it should be treated as an affirmative de-
fense, which the defendant, under rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, has the burden of pleading.20 Fourth, the estab-
lishment of a prima facie case should create a presumption rather
than an inference of discrimination.2 1 Fifth, if the defendant does
not rebut the presumption of discrimination either by successfully
attacking the evidentiary support of the plaintiff's prima facie case
or, more importantly, by proving an independent ground of justifi-
cation, plaintiff in most situations should be entitled to relief.2 2 In
addition, when a defendant asserts an independent ground of justi-
fication based upon either a specific statutory exception or a judi-
cially created defense, he should have both the initial burden of
producing evidence and the ultimate burden of persuasion on that
17. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
18. See notes 208-25 infra and accompanying text.
19. See note 226 infra and accompanying text.
20. See notes 227-46 infra and accompanying text.
21. See notes 247-70 infra and accompanying text.
22. See notes 274-95 infra and accompanying text.
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defense.2 Sixth, the preponderance of the evidence standard
should apply to determine whether the defendant has proven justi-
fication,2" and the plaintiff at all times should have the civil liti-
gant's traditional burden of establishing his claim by a preponder-
ance of all the evidence. In this connection, the court should
abandon the "articulation" standard because it tends to inject into
discrimination cases the scintilla of evidence rule, which generally
has been rejected by the federal courts. Last, the pretext stage of
proof enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green" should be
eliminated, since it allows for the analytically bankrupt possibility
that a court could find both the defense of a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason or business justification and a pretext in the
same case.
2 7
II. BURDENS OF PROOF: DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS
It is essential at the outset to discuss briefly the terms and
concepts most commonly used in the allocation of the burdens of
proof. A court will often use these terms and concepts interchange-
ably and will rarely bother to remove the confusion by explicating
their exact meanings. Therefore, a clear understanding of discrimi-
nation cases is possible only for those who have a'firm grasp on the
semantical jungle that shrouds this confused area of the law."
A. Relevant Elements and Issues
When a plaintiff comes into a court demanding that it take
some action, substantive law determines the relevant elements or
issues29 that must be established or resolved before the plaintiff's
demands will be met. In other words, before the court can arrive at
a final decision, it must first rule upon the various elements of the
plaintiff's case. Substantive law thus can be viewed as rules of con-
ditional imperatives that have a syllogistic form: If such and such,
23. See id.
24. See notes 296-302 infra and accompanying text.
25. See note 301 infra and accompanying text.
26. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
27. See notes 298-302 infra and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (burden of proof more than
a semantic exercise).
29. The proper designation for factual issues that must be decided by a court has been
the subject of lively debate. Thus, for example, courts have discarded terms such as "princi-
ple fact," "ultimate fact," and "operative fact" in favor of the term "material fact," since
the existence or nonexistence of the former terms may be disputed. Michael & Adler, The
Trial of an Issue of Fact: I, 34 CoLu. L. Rxv. 1224, 1252 (1934).
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and unless so and so, then the defendant is liable. In the absence
of either direct evidence or an admission of liability by the defen-
dant, a rule of law that imposes upon the plaintiff the obligation to
plead and prove all of the "ifs," "ands," and "unlesses" would
make it particularly difficult-if not impossible-for him ever to
prevail.30
Fortunately, the courts and the legislatures have not adopted
such a rule. Instead, they have interpreted substantive law to im-
pose upon defendants certain obligations to plead and prove some
of the "ifs" and "unlesses." Any civil case thus can be viewed in
terms of this division: If the plaintiff pleads and proves A, B, and
C, then the plaintiffs demands will be met unless the defendant
establishes X, Y, and Z. In a civil action for negligence, for exam-
ple, A, B, and C might represent proof of the defendant's negli-
gence and the damages resulting therefrom. X, Y, and Z might re-
present contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, or the
contention that the plaintiffs injury was beyond the scope of the
defendant's liability. In a discrimination case, A, B, and C might
represent proof of disparate impact or disparate treatment,31 and
X, Y, and Z might represent either a statutory defense or a judi-
cially created defense such as business necessity or a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason. In other words, our adversary system of
justice imposes the obligation upon the plaintiff to plead and prove
a prima facie case and upon the defendant to plead and prove af-
firmative defenses.
B. The Prima Facie Case Doctrine
Since the plaintiff in a civil action is the party who is seeking
to change the status quo by inducing the court to take some action
in his favor, policy considerations of fairness suggest that the
plaintiff should be required to prove his claim to relief. The critical
question, however, concerns the extent to which the plaintiff must
prove his case at the outset. Is it fair, for example, to require the
plaintiff to prove each and every substantive element of his case
before he is entitled to the relief he seeks? It is in response to this
policy question that the "prima facie case" doctrine is directed. Al-
ternatively stated, the prima facie case doctrine helps to answer
the following question: In the absence of conflicting evidence, how
30. See Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay On Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN.
L. REv. 5, 7 (1959).
31. See notes 90-100 infra and accompanying text.
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much evidence on the elements of his case should a plaintiff be
required to submit in order to sustain a judgment in his favor?
Substantive law thus becomes important, for it sets forth those ele-
ments that are deemed sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to re-
cover-if he can prove them, and unless the defendant establishes
other offsetting elements.3 2
C. Affirmative Defenses
At common law an affirmative defense was a defense that both
admitted the validity of the plaintiff's claim and at the same time
set up new matters to avoid liability. This type of defense served a
threefold purpose; it provided the basis for the judgment, a means
of forming issues of fact, and a record of adjudicated matters. In
performing these functions, the defense also gave sufficient notice
to the opposing party to enable him to prepare a responsive plead-
ing and to prepare for trial.3
Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is the lineal
descendant of this common law rule of "confession and avoidance,"
which allowed a defendant who was willing to admit the plaintiff's
prima facie case to allege new matters that would defeat the plain-
tiff's otherwise valid claim."' Rule 8(c) requires that a party re-
sponding to any claim for relief must affirmatively plead any mat-
ter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. The rule
enumerates nineteen of the most commonly invoked affirmative
defenses, but this list is not intended to be exhaustive. 35 The
32. Cleary, supra note 30, at 7-8. A social policy is reflected in the rule that requires
the plaintiff to carry the burden of producing evidence on a disputed issue at the very be-
ginning of the trial. As the authors of a recent treatise on evidence stated,
Thus, in a typical negligence case, plaintiff initially has the burden of producing
evidence of defendant's negligence. Plaintiff is the legal aggressor, and the substantive
law reflects the social policy of placing the burden of justifying his aggression upon the
party seeking to disturb the status quo by exacting damages from defendant. At trial
the penalty for not producing evidence when obligated to do so is nonsuit, dismissal, or
adverse finding, or when trial is by jury, directed verdict or adverse instruction to the
jury.
1 D. LOUISFLL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 66, at 526 (1980).
The term "prima facie case" is often used in two senses and, like the term "burden of
proof," is ambiguous and often misleading. It may mean evidence that is sufficient to get to
the factfinder; on the other hand, it may mean evidence that is sufficient to shift the burden
of producing evidence. See 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2494.
33. For a discussion of affirmative defenses, see 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1270 (1969).
34. Id.
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c). The rule provides as follows:
Affirmative Defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth af-
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draftsmen of the federal rules recognized that certain defenses
other than those specifically enumerated should be affirmatively
set forth to be put in issue. Rule 8(c), therefore, provides that any
"other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense"
must be pleaded. Neither the rule itself nor federal case law, how-
ever, has set forth a universal test for courts to use in determining
whether a defendant is required to plead affirmatively a defense
not specifically enumerated. Courts usually rely upon a variety of
factors in making this determination; considerations of policy, fair-
ness, and probability of success, however, typically are given the
greatest weight.3
As a general rule, the procedural effect of pleading an affirma-
tive defense is to place upon the defendant the burdens of plead-
ing, production of evidence, and persuasion. The defendant thus
carries a heavy burden by pleading such a defense, but if he suc-
cessfully meets this burden, he generally will win his case.
D. The Three Burdens: Pleading, Production of Evidence, and
Persuasion
A leading characteristic of the Anglo-American procedural sys-
tem is its adversary nature. In civil litigation the decisions of
whether to initiate and prosecute the litigation, investigate the
pertinent facts, and present evidence and legal arguments to the
courts generally *are left to the parties themselves. The court's
function, in general, is limited to deciding, on the evidence
presented, the claims submitted by the parties. Since this system
requires that all evidence be presented by the parties themselves,
the courts have devised procedural rules to dispose of those cases
in which either the claim or the evidence is so inadequate-or so
conflicting-that neither party can convince the factfinder of his
version of the case. The burdens of pleading, production of evi-
dence, and persuasion are the procedural devices that courts have
developed to aid them in making this determination. 8
firmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contrib-
utory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration,
fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata,
statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an
avoidance or affirmative defense.
36. See C. WaiGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 33, § 1271.
37. See id. § 1271, at 311-16.
38. The subject of burdens of proof in civil litigation has received extensive treatment
in the literature. See, e.g., F. JAMES & G. HAzARD, supra note 3, §§ 7.5-.9; E. MORGAN, SOME
PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LITIGATION 72-86 (1956); J.
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The burden of pleading imposes upon a party the obligation to
notify his opponent and the court, in the appropriate manner, of
the elements upon which he intends to rely either to sustain or to
defeat liability. The policy behind the pleading burden is to pro-
vide notice to the courts and to the other party of the nature of a
claim or defense upon which evidence will be presented to the
court.3 9
The burden of producing evidence, or-as it is sometimes
called-the burden of going forward with the evidence, is the obli-
gation imposed upon a party during trial to present evidence on
the element at issue. The evidence presented must be of sufficient
substance to permit the factfinder to act upon it. This burden aids
the court in determining whether, if the trial were halted at the
conclusion of the party's presentation, the court would immedi-
ately decide the case itself or instead send it to the jury. In jury
cases the penalty that is imposed upon a party who has failed to
meet the burden of production on a particular element of the case
is to have that element taken away from the jury through one of a
variety of procedural devices such as nonsuit, directed verdict, or
dismissal. Thus, the burden of producing evidence first comes into
play at the beginning of trial.40
The burden of persuasion refers to the risk of uncertainty
about an element's resolution. When the parties are in dispute over
a material element of a case, the party having the burden of per-
suasion on that element will lose if the factfinder's mind is in equi-
poise after he has considered all the relevant evidence.41 The de-
gree of certainty required to determine whether the burden of
persuasion has been met is subject to different standards; for ex-
ample, some cases have relied upon the preponderance of the evi-
dence test, while others have required a showing of clear and con-
vincing evidence.42 In a jury case the burden of persuasion is
introduced to the jury by the court's instructions. Jurors are told
what to do if they find that the evidence favors either the plaintiff
THAYER, supra note 11, at 353-89; 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, §§ 2485-2489; Cleary, supra
note 30, at 15-25; Dworkin, Easy Cases, Bad Law, and Burdens of Proof, 25 VAND. L. REv.
1151 (1972); James, Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. REV. 51 (1961); Laughlin, The Location of
the Burden of Persuasion, 18 U. Prrr. L. REv. 3 (1956); Morgan, How to Approach Burden
of Proof and Presumptions, 25 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 34 (1952-1953).
39. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980); F. JAMEs & G. HAZARD, supra note 3, §§
2.1-.3; 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MMLER, supra note 33, § 1202.
40. See F. JAws & G. HAZARD, supra note 3, § 7.7, at 245.
41. See id. § 7.6, at 243.
42. See McBaine, supra note 3.
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or the defendant, as well as what to do if they find that the evi-
dence is equally balanced on the various elements of the case. In a
case tried by the court, the burden of persuasion becomes relevant
only when the judge, after all the evidence has been presented,
finds that the evidence for both sides is equally persuasive. 3
The burdens of production and persuasion may or may not be
assigned to the same party. A number of cases have assigned to the
plaintiff the burdens of pleading, production, and persuasion on
the elements necessary to establish a prima facie case, but have
assigned to the defendants these same burdens on affirmative de-
fenses.'4 The plaintiff, for example, may be required to plead, in-
troduce evidence, and persuade the factfinder on the existence of
element A, while the defendant may have to plead and prove the
existence of element B as an affirmative defense.
E. Tests for Allocating the Burdens
As stated above, the courts have not yet developed any univer-
sal rule or set of policy considerations for courts to rely upon in
determining how the three burdens should be allocated between
the parties. If legislation has specified which party must bear a
particular burden, this resolves the issue, so long as the statute
does not transgress constitutional limitations."5 Absent clear direc-
tives from the legislative branch, however, the nearest thing to a
general rule for allocating burdens is the one that imposes upon
the plaintiff the burden of pleading and proving the elements of a
prima facie case through a showing of a causal connection between
his injury and the defendant's conduct. A corollary to this rule re-
quires the plaintiff to plead and prove only those facts necessary to
establish a prima facie case; if the defendant intends to rely upon
the nonexistence or nonfulfillment of other conditions that are not
necessary to the plaintiff's case, then he must plead and prove
those conditions under the affirmative defense rule.'4
Many different burden allocation tests have emerged from the
cases and literature, but there is little consensus on a favored ap-
proach. All the tests, however, are grounded in considerations such
as policy rationales, fairness, and the probability that the event in
43. See F. JAMEs & G. HAZARD, supra note 3, § 7.6.
44. Id.
45. See Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1980); Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197 (1977).
46. See F. JAmEs & G. HAZARD, supra note 3, § 2.9, at 77-78.
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question actually occurred."7 Unfortunately, these considerations
do not afford complete guidance to courts in making their determi-
nations, though courts have made some efforts to ascribe meaning
to them.48 The courts' concern for policy considerations, for exam-
ple, is reflected in Judge Clark's often quoted remark that "[o]ne
who must bear the risk of getting the matter properly set before
the court . . . has to that extent the dice loaded against him. ' '
Courts have interpreted this remark to establish a test that places
the burden for a particular element on the initiating party. Thus,
this party will lose the lawsuit if notice of that element is not
brought to the attention of the court, and evidence of its existence
or nonexistence is not presented. Considerations of fairness, on
the other hand, are concerned with the possibility that evidence on
a particular element may lie more within the knowledge or control
of one party than another.5 1 A court's concern for fairness, then,
may lead it to allocate the burdens on that question to the more
knowledgeable party.
Courts also give considerable weight to estimates of the
probability that an event occurred by a departure from a supposed
norm.52 The probabilities may relate to the type of situation out of
which the litigation arises, or they may relate to the litigation it-
self. The standards are quite different and often produce different
47. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 209 (1973) (citing 9 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 3, § 2486, at 275 (3d ed. 1940)); Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 446
(1959); Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117 (1943); Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S.
208, 212 (1939).
48. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 3, § 7.8, at 249-53; Cleary, supra note 30, at
8-14; Laughlin, supra note 38.
49. C. CLARK, supra note 15, at 609.
50. Judge Clark has defined the meaning of the word "policy" in this context as
follows:
[J]ust as certain disfavored allegations made by the plaintiff... must be set forth
with the greatest particularity, so like disfavored defenses must be particularly alleged
by the defendant. These may include such matters as fraud, statute of frauds... stat-
ute of limitations, truth in slander and libel... and so on. In other cases the mere
question of convenience may seem more prominent, as in the case of payment, where
the defendant can more easily show the affirmative of payment at a certain time than
the plaintiff can the negative of nonpayment over a period of time. Again it may be an
issue which may be generally used for dilatory tactics, such as the question of the
plaintiff's right to sue... a vital question, but one usually raised by the defendant on
technical grounds. These have been thought of as issues "likely to take the opposite
party by surprise," which perhaps conveys the general idea of fairness or the lack
thereof, though there is little real surprise where the case is well prepared in advance.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
51. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980).
52. See Cleary, supra note 30.
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results. If one assumes, for example, that most people pay their
bills, the probability is that any bill selected at random has been
paid. A plaintiff suing to collect a bill, therefore, would be respon-
sible for demonstrating nonpayment as an element of his prima
facie case. If, however, one views the probabilities solely from the
standpoint of those bills upon which suit is brought, he will reach a
different conclusion: plaintiffs are not prone to sue for paid bills;
thus, the probability is that the bill is unpaid. Hence, from this
viewpoint payment would be an affirmative defense.5 3 If this
rationale were applied to discrimination cases, and it were assumed
that individuals comply with the law, the probability is that a
charge of discrimination against a defendant is unfounded. There-
fore, a plaintiff bringing suit would have to establish discrimina-
tion as an element of his prima facie case. If, however, one analyzes
the situation from the vantage point of either the legislative his-
tory or the number of suits that are brought,5 the result will be
different, since plaintiffs are not likely to sue when they have been
fairly treated; hence, compliance with the law would be an affirma-
tive defense.
F. Degrees of Belief
The judiciary and the legislatures have devised different stan-
dards for the evaluation of evidence to meet the burden of persua-
sion in different types of cases and issues. The most obvious differ-
ence, of course, is between criminal and civil cases. Courts and
legislatures have designed standards as a means to control the
mental processes of the factfinder and as a guide to judges in cases
tried by the court without a jury. These standards essentially pro-
vide a measurement of the persuasive force required for the fulfill-
ment of the burden of persuasion. The tests generally fit into one
of the following three categories: Proof by a preponderance of the
evidence; proof by clear and convincing evidence; and proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt.5
The test applied in most civil cases requires a preponderance
of the evidence to be in favor of the party who has the burden of
proof on an issue. The terms "preponderance" and "the greater
53. Id. at 13.
54. See note 1 supra. Cf. Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 638 F.2d 1137, 1143-44 (8th Cir.
1981) (affinative action plan is not a complete defense to claim of reverse discrimination).
But see United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). See generally Belton, supra
note 2.
55. See generally McBaine, supra note 3.
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weight of evidence" generally are considered synonymous; they
simply mean that the factfinder must believe that the existence of
a fact is more probable than its nonexistence.8 6 A court's instruc-
tion to a jury usually includes a cautionary statement that the
greater weight or preponderance of the evidence does not necessa-
rily mean either the greater quantity of evidence or the larger
number of witnesses. The typical instruction goes on to state that
the standard instead refers to the greater persuasiveness of the evi-
dence, and that the jury must factor the credibility of witnesses
and the weight to be given their testimony into the evaluation of
all the evidence as a whole.57 Notwithstanding these elaborate
statements, however, it is generally believed that the instructions
actually mislead and confuse the jury rather than enlighten them.58
They are also believed to have little, if any, effect upon the think-
ing process of the average juryman, whose intuitions, feelings, and
experiences are in fact what influence his convictions about the
greater weight of the evidence. 5
A second standard of proof used in civil cases is expressed in a
variety of ways and lies somewhere between the preponderance of
the evidence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which is the
standard used in criminal cases. It is most commonly articulated as
proof by "clear and convincing evidence." s Other similar expres-
sions include "clear, precise, and indubitable evidence," "clear con-
viction without hesitation," "clear, satisfactory, and convincing ev-
idence," and the like."' This higher standard of proof usually
becomes a substantive consideration in actions in which the court
believes that the status quo should not be altered by a "mere pre-
56. Proof by a preponderance or the greater weight of the evidence is the common
standard for civil proceedings. 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2498. Under this test the trier
of fact
must believe that it is more probable that the facts are true or exist than it is that they
are false or do not exist; but, it is not necessary to believe that there is a high
probability that they are true or exist, or necessary to believe to a point of almost
certainty, or beyond a reasonable doubt, that they are true or exist, or necessary to
believe that they certainly are true or exist.
McBaine, supra note 3, at 261; see C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 339, at 794-95.
57. See Morgan, Instructing the Jury upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47
HARv. L. REV. 59, 64 (1933).
58. See Morse, Evidentiary Lexicology, 59 DiCK. L. REv. 86 (1954).
59. See McBaine, supra note 3; Morse, supra note 58.
60. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (school desegregation
case); United Steelworkers v. Warrier & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583 n.7 (1960)
(labor case). See also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
61. See McBaine, supra note 3, at 253.
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ponderance of evidence."82
G. Presumptions and Inferences
Few areas of the law have produced as much confusion and
discord as the subject of presumptions."3 Presumptions contain el-
ements of both substantive and procedural law and are caught in a
conflict between modern doctrinal development and judicial iner-
tia. They have been defined, classified, explained, and criticized in
numerous court opinions and in volumes of legal commentaries."
One basic source of conflict concerns the exact nature of their pre-
cise procedural effect. Closely related to this conflict is the tension
between the varying theories on the quantity and quality of evi-
dence required to rebut a presumption. Moreover, jurists and
scholars alike differ on the propriety of giving the jury instructions
about presumptions. Courts and commentators have made assidu-
ous efforts at classification and have carefully articulated the bases
on which various presumptions rest. This overall confusion is man-
62. This intermediate burden of proof standard-clear and convincing evi-
dence-reduces the probability that an innocent party will be held liable. See Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 369-70 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). This standard requires a belief by the factfinder
that it is highly probable that the facts are true or exist; while it is not necessary to
believe to the point of almost certainty, or beyond a reasonable doubt that they are
true or exist, or that they certainly are true or exist; yet it is not sufficient to believe
that it is merely more probable that they are true or exist than it is that they are false
or do not exist.
McBaine, supra note 3, at 262-63. See also J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE 180-81 (1947); C. McCoR-
MICK, supra note 3, § 340(b), at 796-98; J. WEINSTEIN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF STATE AND FED-
ERAL EVIDENCE 17 (5th ed. 1976). This intermediate standard is also applied to proceedings
in which a party attempts to prove fraud, undue influence, the provisions of a lost will or
deed, a parol gift, a mutual mistake sufficient to allow a court to reform a contract, and the
invalidity of a notary's certificate. 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2498. The phrases "clear
and convincing," "clear, unequivocal, and convincing," "convincing proof," and "clear and
substantial" have all been used to indicate an intermediate standard.
63. "Every writer of sufficient intelligence to appreciate the difficulties of the subject-
matter has approached the topic of presumptions with a sense of hopelessness and has left it
with a feeling of despair." Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WASH. L. REV. 255, 255 (1937).
64. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, §§ 336-347; J. THAYER, supra note 11, at
313-52; 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, §§ 2483-2540; Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Pre-
sumptions of Law upon the Burden of Proof, 68 U. PA. L. REV. 307 (1920); Gausewitz,
Presumptions in a One-Rule World, 5 VAND. L. REV. 324 (1952); Hecht & Pinzler, Rebut-
ting Presumptions: Order Out of Chaos, 58 B.U. L. REv. 527 (1978); Ladd, Presumptions in
Civil Actions, 1977 ARIz. ST. L.J. 275; Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of Pre-
sumptions, 52 MICH. L. REV. 195 (1953); McCormick, Charges on Presumptions and Burden
of Proof, 5 N.C. L. RPv. 291 (1927); Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions,
44 HARv. L. REv. 906 (1931) [hereinafter cited as Observations]; Morgan, Techniques in the
Use of Presumptions, 24 IowA L. REv. 413 (1939); Reaugh, Presumptions and the Burden of
Proof (pts. 1-2), 36 ILL. L. REV. 703, 819 (1942).
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ifest in discrimination cases, particularly in the characterization of
the plaintiff's prima facie case, which is sometimes referred to as a
presumption and at other times as an inference.65
A presumption, generally defined, is a rule of law that deals
with the assumption-at least temporarily-of a certain factual
situation based upon proof of other usually logically related facts.6
Presumptions usually are developed for reasons of convenience,
policy, probability, or necessity. The weight of authority holds that
genuine presumptions are neither evidence nor substitutes for evi-
dence, but are merely procedural devices that shift the burden of
producing evidence to the party against whom it operates. They
are rebuttable and not conclusive, though they are more than mere
permissible inferences.6 7 Indeed, a "conclusive presumption" is not
a presumption at all, but rather is a rule of substantive law. Al-
though there is nothing sacrosanct about the term presumption,
and many variations of the term theoretically could exist, only
those devices that operate as burden-shifters are properly labelled
presumptions."' A presumption that purports to operate against a
party who has both the burden of persuasion and the burden of
going forward with the evidence, therefore, is anomalous and re-
dundant, since it merely restates the already existing burden of
proof on a given issue. Nevertheless, inaccurate use of the term to
include other concepts has resulted in confusing and incongruous
attempts to apply a presumption analysis in inappropriate
situations.
An inference, unlike a presumption, is a deduction warranted
by human reason and experience that the factfinder may make
from established facts. The term refers to a process of reasoning
from a premise to a conclusion, the end result of which has the
directive force of a rule of law-which characterizes a presump-
tion." For example, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,70 which
makes the finding of a set of facts in itself sufficient to submit an
issue to the jury, does not create a presumption of negligence. The
jury may find negligence, but it is not required to do so even in the
65. See note 135 infra and accompanying text.
66. This is a simplified definition based upon a composite of those definitions that are
stated in various sources. See note 64 supra.
67. See Hecht & Pinzler, supra note 64, at 529.
68. See Gausewitz, supra note 64, at 325.
69. See Legille v. Dann, 544 F.2d 1, 5 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
70. See generally Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 MNN. L.
REV. 241 (1936).
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absence of rebuttal evidence. Indeed, if an inference is truly
mandatory, it amounts to a presumption. "Permissive inference,"
therefore, is a redundant phrase. The use of the term "compulsory
inferences," however, is justified on occasion to indicate an infer-
ence so strong that it must be acceptable to a reasonable mind, but
not strong enough to amount to a recognized presumption.
III. THE PROBLEM AND ITS SOURCES
A. The Causation Principle
Federal laws that prohibit discrimination 1 generally contain
broad prohibitory language which makes it unlawful to discrimi-
nate on the basis of race, sex, national origin, religion, or age. Some
of these laws make it unlawful to engage in "intentional discrimi-
nation";72 others simply use the term "discriminate" without the
qualification of "intent";73 and still others contain neither version
of these terms.7 4 Courts have held that a determination of discrim-
ination requires a finding of a nexus between the plaintiff's claim
and the defendant's conduct.7 5 The operative nexus between the
71. The concept of "discrimination" is susceptible to varying interpretations. See Re-
gents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 284 (1978) (Powell, J., plurality opinion);
Belton, supra note 2; Fiss, supra note 5.
72. E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). Section
706(g) provides that "[i]f a court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in" prohibited practices, then the court may order an appropriate
remedy. The major substantive provisions under Title VII do not use the term "intent." Id.
§§ 2000e-2(a)(1)-2(a)(2). But see id. §§ 2000e-2(h), -5(g).
73. The Equal Pay Act of 1963 provides that "[n]o employer having employees subject
to any provisions of this section shall discriminate ... on the basis of sex by paying [une-
qual wages]." 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
74. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The fourteenth amendment states that "[n]o
State shall make or enforce any laws which ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." The Civil Rights Statute of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976),
does not use the terms "discriminate," "effect," or "intent" but simply provides for "the
same right.., to make and enforce contracts"; this statute has been held, however, to
prohibit racial discrimination in the private sector. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (employment); accord, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968) (housing). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
75. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 489 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing); Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285 (1977) (consti-
tutional case); EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1980) ("There
must be a logical and rational connection between the basic facts presented in evidence and
the ultimate fact to be inferred."); Smith v. University of N.C., 632 F.2d 316, 336 (4th Cir.
1980) (age discrimination case) ("While Mt. Healthy arises under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, both in it and in our ADEA case, the question of causality is involved in
essentially the same fashion."); De La Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 59 (9th Cir. 1978) (equal
protection and Title IX); Rogers v. EEOC, 403 F. Supp. 1240, 1242 (D.D.C. 1975) (employ-
ment discrimination). See also Young v. Klutznick, 652 F.2d 617, 630-31 nn.3-5 (6th Cir.
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prohibited conduct and liability generally is expressed in terms
such as "based on,"'76 "because of,"77 "on the ground of,"78 "ad-
versely affect,"79 or "tend to."80 This nexus generally is referred to
as either causation-in-fact or the causation principle.81 The justifi-
cation for the causation principle is that legal liability should be
imposed only in those cases in which the defendant's conduct and
the plaintiff's claim are so significantly and closely related that the
law should impose liability.
2
While the effective enforcement of discrimination laws re-
quires evidence that affords a reasonable basis upon which to find
a causal connection between the plaintiff's claim and the defen-
dant's conduct, such a finding is not, in all cases, susceptible of
clear and certain demonstration. Moreover, it is increasingly rare
to encounter the kinds of direct and overt practices that originally
prompted Congress to enact the discrimination laws. Many claims
of discrimination today deal with systemic, subtle, and sterotypical
practices-which developed when overt discrimination was law-
ful-and are imbedded in basic institutional and organizational
structures." Thus, if the requirements for proof of a causal rela-
1981) (Keith, j:, dissenting).
76. See, e.g., Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976).
77. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1976);
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), -2(c)(1) (1976).
78. See, e.g., State and Local Financial Assistance Act (Revenue Sharing Act of 1972),
31 U.S.C. §§ 1221, 1242(a)(1) (1976). The Act provides that "[n]o person in the United
States, shall on the ground of race, color, national origin, or sex be excluded from participa-
tion in, be denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination [in federally funded pro-
grams]." (emphasis added). See also Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968,
42 U.S.C. § 3766 (1976).
79. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1976).
80. Id.
81. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 41 (4th ed. 1971). Dean Pros-
ser summarized the notion as follows:
Causation is a fact. It is a matter of what has in fact occurred. A cause is a neces-
sary antecedent: in a very real and practical sense, the term embraces all things which
have so far contributed to the result that without them it would not have occurred. It
covers not only the positive acts and active physical forces, but also pre-existing pas-
sive conditions which have played a material part in bringing about the event.
Id. § 41, at 237 (footnotes omitted). See generally Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact,
9 STAN. L. REv. 60 (1956).
82. As Dean Prosser stated, "Some boundaries must be set to liability for the conse-
quences of any act, upon the basis of some social idea of justice or policy." W. PROSSER,
supra note 81, § 41, at 237.
83. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
707 (1978) ("Myths and purely habitual assumptions about a woman's'inability to perform
certain kinds of work are no longer acceptable reasons for refusing to employ qualified indi-
viduals."); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 365 n.51 (1977) ("The far-ranging ef-
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tionship are too rigorous, effective enforcement will not be
achieved.84 On the other hand, lenient proof requirements may re-
sult in a finding of discrimination when the defendant's conduct is
legitimate, arbitrary, or simply unreasonable.8 5
A difficult substantive and policy problem that the causation
principle presents in discrimination cases is that concepts such as
"because of," "based on," "tend to," or "adversely affect" may be
construed as requiring any one of the following: (1) An effects test;
(2) an intent test; (3) both effect and intent; or (4) either effect or
intent.8 " Major substantive doctrines have developed around these
alternatives; these doctrines, however, have been relied upon by
the courts in ways that contribute to rather than clarify the confu-
sion about the allocation of the burdens of pleading and proof. No
attempt is made here to resolve this fundamental substantive
problem;8 7 since it generally is agreed, however, that procedure ex-
fects of subtle discriminatory practices have not escaped the scrutiny of the federal courts
... ."); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764-65 n.21 (1976) ("employment
discrimination as viewed today is a... complex and pervasive phenomenon. Experts famil-
iar with the subject now generally describe the problem in terms of 'systems' and 'effects'
rather than simply intentional wrongs."); Rodriquez v. Board of Educ., 620 F.2d 362, 364
(2d Cir. 1980) (discrimination unaccompanied by pecuniary loss is "subtle" and remediable
even when other terms of employment are not unequal); Pettway v. American Cast Iron
Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 231 (5th Cir. 1974) (recognizing that procedures which depend al-
most entirely on subjective evaluations and favorable recommendations from immediate su-
pervisors may provide a "ready mechanism" for discrimination).
84. See, e.g., County of Washington v. Gunther, 101 S. Ct. 2242 (1981); Jackson v.
United States Steel Corp., 624 F.2d 436, 440-41 (3d Cir. 1980) (courts should not be "overly
demanding" in the proof required to establish a prima facie case). According to the analysis
in Gunther, Congress intended Title VII's prohibition of discriminatory employment prac-
tices to be broadly construed. 101 S. Ct. at 2248. Thus, the Court stated that Title VII's
proscription applies "not only [to] overt discrimination but also [to] practices that are fair
in form, but discriminatory in operation." Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 431 (1971)). "The structure of Title VII litigation, including presumptions, burdens of
proof, and defenses, has been designed to reflect this approach." Id.
85. Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150, 1156-57 (2d Cir. 1978) ("[Ihe law does
not require, in the first instance, that employment be rational, wise, or well-consid-
ered-only that it be nondiscriminatory."); Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d
1251, 1257 (5th Cir. 1977) ("Title VII and section 1981 do not protect against unfair busi-
ness decisions-only against decisions motivated by unlawful animus.").
86. Disagreements among courts within the various circuits over the appropriate ana-
lytical approach are often manifest in the cases. See, e.g., Chrisner v. Complete Auto
Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251 (6th Cir. 1981); Wright v. National Archives & Records, 609
F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1969). See also Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 581-85
(1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Christensen & Svanoe, Mo-
tive and Intent in the Commission of Unfair Labor Practices: The Supreme Court and the
Fictive Formality, 77 YALE L.J. 1269 (1968) (discussing the problem in the context of the
National Labor Relations Act); Fiss, supra note 5.
87. For a discussion of some of the substantive analytical problems under statutes
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ists only for the purpose of effectively implementing substantive
law, a brief review of the substantive developments is necessary.
1. Intent v. Effect: The Statutory Cases
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196488 is the principal stat-
ute under which the major substantive theories of discrimination
law have developed.89 Congress enacted Title VII to prohibit dis-
crimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin.
The goal of Title VII could have been accomplished in a variety of
ways. Congress could have expressed the prohibition in terms of
motive or intent, or it could have defined discrimination solely in
terms of effect. Unfortunately, the statutory language that Con-
gress chose did not identify clearly which of these concepts is nec-
essary for a finding of unlawful discrimination. The Supreme
Court, however, has interpreted Title VII to embrace both sub-
stantive concepts.
In Griggs v. Duke Power CoY° the Supreme Court, in its first
major Title VII case, adopted an effects test and specifically re-
jected an intent or motive test. In rejecting the argument that dis-
criminatory intent is an essential element in a violation of Title
prohibiting discrimination, see Belton, supra note 2; Fiss, supra note 5.
The role of discriminatory motivation as an indispensable element in race discrimina-
tion cases has been the subject of much commentary. According to Professor Brest, "[tihe
Court's entire line of civil rights precedent, beginning in 1879 with Strauder v. West Vir-
ginia [100 U.S. 303 (1880)], explicitly turns on the race-dependence of the practices invali-
dated." Brest, The Supreme Court 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimina-
tion Principle, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1, 27 (1976) (footnote omitted). But see Ely, Legislative
and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1208-09 (1970).
88. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
89. Title VII was the first comprehensive federal statute to make it an unlawful em-
ployment practice for employers, unions, and employment agencies to discriminate on the
basis of race, sex, national origin, or religion. See Belton, supra note 1. Many of the sub-
stantive and procedural developments under Title VII have been applied to other forms of
discrimination such as age, equal pay, credit, housing, and public accommodation. See, e.g.,
Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979) (Age Discrimination in Employment
Act and Title VII share a common purpose and the same construction should apply to
both); Smith v. University of N.C., 632 F.2d 316 (4th Cir. 1980) (many courts, in setting
forth the elements of proof and the allocation of the burdens of proof in discrimination
cases, have borrowed from Title VII law); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir.
1979); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977) (housing discrimination
under 1968 Fair Housing Act); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th
Cir. 1974) (housing); Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 826 (8th Cir. 1974) (Title VII
prima facie concept applicable in housing discrimination case under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976),
and the Fair Housing Act of 1968); Association Against Discrimination in Employment v.
City of Bridgeport, 479 F. Supp. 101, 111 (D. Conn. 1979) (Title VI and the Revenue Shar-
ing Act).
90. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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VII, the Court held that "good intent or absence of discriminatory
intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mecha-
nisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds'" for protected groups
and "are unrelated to measuring job capability." 1 Title VII was
held to be directed at the "consequences of employment practices,
not simply the motivation."92 Griggs thus established the "dispa-
rate impact" theory of discrimination.93 Broadly read, this theory
holds that facially neutral practices which have an adverse impact
on the opportunities of members of protected classes-practices
that on their face do not separate or classify according to an im-
permissible criteria-are unlawful unless the practice is shown to
be mandated by business necessity or to have a manifest relation-
ship to some legitimate interest of the defendant. Under this inter-
pretation, Griggs stands for the proposition that the Title VII pro-
hibition proscribes any conduct which operates as the functional
equivalent of intentional discrimination.9 4 Lower courts have read
Griggs in just this way: once a finding of disparate impact is made,
courts generally do not require independent proof of a specific
intent to bring about that impact.95
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,96 decided several years
after Griggs, the Court enunciated the "disparate treatment" the-
ory of discrimination under Title VII. Disparate treatment, unlike
disparate impact, requires a finding of a specific intent to discrimi-
nate. A violation under the disparate treatment theory requires
proof from which the factfinder can infer-if the conduct remains
unexplained-that more likely than not the action was "based on a
91. Id. at 432.
92. Id.
93. This test is referred to in many forms: Disproportionate impact; discriminatory
impact; disparate effects; adverse impact or effects; and disparate effects. The Court in
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976), used the terms "discriminatory impact," and
"disproportionate impact" interchangeably. The term "effects" was used throughout Davis
and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
94. See Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept
of Employment Discrimination, 71 MIcH. L. Rav. 59 (1972); Fiss, supra note 5, at 296-304.
95. See United States v. Lee Way Freight, Inc., 625 F.2d 918, 942 (10th Cir. 1979) ("in
reexamining disparate impact, it should be recognized that it is not necessary to show that
there has been intentional disparate treatment directed against any particular member of
that class. The disparate impact or consequence is enough."). But see Resident Advisory Bd.
v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 143 n.23 (3d Cir. 1977) (court, comparing the disparate impact theory
with the constitutional standard, see notes 116-24 infra and accompanying text, noted that
once disparate impact is shown, the normal course will be to search out other facts that, in
conjunction with the impact, will demonstrate discriminatory purpose).
96. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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discriminatory criterion illegal under the Act. '97 Proof of discrimi-
natory intent, however, can be inferred from circumstantial
evidence.98
McDonnell Douglas did not reverse the Griggs disparate im-
pact theory; indeed, it preserved the Griggs effects test by reiterat-
ing the premises upon which it had been decided.99 Yet it was this
97. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978) (quoting Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977)). The Court has made clear that a distinction be-
tween disparate impact and disparate treatment turns on the element of intent:
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that stress "dis-
parate impact." The latter involve employment practices that are facially neutral in
their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than
another and cannot be justified by business necessity .... Proof of discriminatory
motive, we have held, is not required under a disparate impact theory. Compare, e.g.,
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-432, with McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-806 .... Either theory may, of course, be applied to a partic-
ular set of facts.
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977). See also Board of Educ. v.
Harris, 444 U.S. 130 (1979). This distinction is analogous to the de facto/de jure distinction
in school desegregation cases. See Moses v. Washington Parish School Bd., 276 F. Supp.
834, 840 (E.D. La. 1967); Note, Reading the Mind of the School Board: Segregative Intent
and the De FactolDe Jure Distinction, 86 YALE L.J. 317 (1976).
98. See Note, The Role of Circumstantial Evidence In Proving Discriminatory In-
tent: Developments Since Washington v. Davis, 19 B.C. L. Rxv. 795 (1978).
99. The Court reaffirmed in McDonnell Douglas the premise on which Griggs was de-
cided by noting that the ultimate goal of Title VII is the elimination of "discriminatory
practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the disad-
vantage of minority citizens." 411 U.S. at 800. The Court, however, held that the court of
appeals erred in applying the Griggs theory of discrimination to the facts of the case:
The court below appeared to rely upon Griggs ... in which the Court stated: "If
an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be re-
lated to job performance, the practice is prohibited.". . . But Griggs differs from the
instant case in important respects. It dealt with standardized testing devices which,
however neutral on their face, operated to exclude many blacks who were capable of
performing effectively in the desired positions. Griggs was rightly concerned that child-
hood deficiencies in the education and background of minority citizens, resulting from
forces beyond their control, not be allowed to work a cumulative and invidious burden
on such citizens for the remainder of their lives .... [Plaintiff], however, appears in
different clothing. He had engaged in a seriously disruptive act against the very one
from whom he now seeks employment. And [defendant] does not seek his exclusion on
the basis of a testing device which overstates what is necessary for competent perform-
ance, or through some sweeping disqualification of all those with any past record of
unlawful behavior, however remote, insubstantial, or unrelated to applicant's personal
qualifications as an employee. [Defendant] assertedly rejected [plaintiff] for unlawful
conduct against it and, in the absence of proof of pretext or discriminatory application
of such a reason, this cannot be thought the kind of "artificial, arbitrary and unneces-
sary barriers to employment" which the Court found to be the intention of Congress to
remove.
Id. at 805-06 (citations omitted). The Court later attempted to explain the distinction be-
tween Griggs and McDonnell Douglas on the ground that Griggs interpreted only 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(h). Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 n.21 (1975). Unlike 42 U.S.C.
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Procrustean attempt to distinguish Griggs and at the same time
enunciate a new theory that has become a critical source of the
present confusion on the allocation of the burdens of pleading and
proof in discrimination cases, since some claims of discrimination
now must be analyzed from the standpoint of intent. Thus, in the
disparate treatment cases courts cannot base an ultimate finding of
discrimination on the effects of a practice; under McDonnell Doug-
las, plaintiffs are instead required to present evidence sufficient to
support a finding of specific intent to discriminate.100
The Court's reading of these two theories of discrimination
into Title VII has resulted in important and far-reaching conse-
quences. One of the most significant consequences is that courts
must make largely artificial judgments in many discrimination
cases. Only an unsophisticated defendant will leave the kind of di-
rect evidence of an intent that can be challenged under the laws
prohibiting discrimination. 101 Thus, while the evidence of a prior
§ 2000e-2(a)(2), however, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), specifically refers to "intent."
100. The McDonnell Douglas theory of a prima facie case holds that a complainant in
a discrimination case must initially carry the burden to prove discrimination. The Court
stated,
This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he
applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii)
that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the
position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications.
411 U.S. at 802 (footnotes omitted). Later, when the Supreme Court held in Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15 (1977), that intent is an element in a disparate treat-
ment case but not in a disparate impact case, the question of how to reconcile McDonnell
Douglas with the Teamsters' footnote became one of concern for the lower courts. Several
courts of appeals attempted to reconcile these cases on the ground that the elements of a
prima facie case give rise to an inference of discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Lieberman v.
Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 63 n.2 (2d Cir. 1980) (" '[p]roof of discriminatory motive is critical,' but
the elements of a prima facie case set forth in McDonnell Douglas supply the requisite
proof as an initial matter") (quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15
(1977)); Meyer v. Missouri State Highway Comm'n, 567 F.2d 804, 808 (8th Cir. 1977)
("showing of differences in treatment" necessary to establish a prima facie case under Mc-
Donnell Douglas "often implies discriminatory intent"), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978);
Chavez v. Tempe Union High School Dist. No. 213, 565 F.2d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 1977) ("[a]
showing of the four factors in McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of discriminatory mo-
tive"). The courts recognize, however, that it is much easier to prevail on a discrimination
claim under disparate impact than under disparate treatment, see, e.g., Burwell v. Eastern
Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 369 n.9 (4th Cir. 1980), and that either theory may be applied
to a particular set of facts. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977);
Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1980).
101. See, e.g., United States v. Board of School Conm'rs, 573 F.2d 400, 412 (7th Cir.)
("in an age when it is unfashionable for state officials to openly express racial hostility,
direct evidence of overt bigotry will be impossible to find"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824
(1978).
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history of subjective intent to discriminate was clear in Griggs,02
one could only speculate about the actual intent in McDonnell
Douglas because the decision seemed to treat the absence of prior
history of racial discrimination as critical to the result.103
Another consequence of the Court's reading of an intent re-
quirement into the statutory language has been the concealment
and distortion of congressional approval for the disparate impact
standard.104 It has also forced the courts to create an artificial and
untenable dichotomy in the statutory prohibitions against discrim-
ination. Because of this dichotomy, a finding of discrimination de-
pends in substantial part upon which theory is given precedence in
a particular case. In Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,105 for
example, defendant had a policy of employing only bricklayers who
had worked with one of its superintendents in the past; applicants
who applied at the job site were not considered for employment.
The company maintained a list of former employees, and defen-
dant's superintendents used it to make their employment deci-
sions. Defendant's alleged justification for its policy of refusing to
hire at the job site was based on business necessity1ee-the need to
assure that only qualified bricklayers were employed. Plaintiffs,
black bricklayers who had applied at the job site and had been
rejected, relied upon both the disparate treatment and disparate
impact theories. 07 A majority of the Court, however, analyzed the
case only under the disparate treatment theory. Notwithstanding
102. "[P]rior to July 2, 1965, the effective date of [Title VII] ... the Company
openly discriminated on the basis of race." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426-27
(1971).
103. In attempting to distinguish Griggs in McDonnell Douglas the Court stated that
"Griggs was rightly concerned that childhood deficiencies in the education and background
of minority citizens, resulting from forces beyond their control, not be allowed to work a
cumulative and invidious burden on such citizens.... Respondent, however, appears in
different clothing." 411 U.S. at 806 (citation omitted).
104. Griggs was decided before the 1972 amendments to Title VII. The legislative his-
tory of the 1972 amendment reveals that Congress generally approved of the theory that the
Court had adopted in Griggs. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 390-91 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting); S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 & n.1 (1971), reprinted in
EEOC, LEGISLAT E HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AcT OF 1972, at 414
(1972); H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 21-22 (1971), reprinted in EEOC, LEGISLA-
TIvE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EmpLOYmENT OPPORTUNrY AcT OF 1972, at 68, 80-81 (1972).
McDonnell Douglas, decided after the 1972 amendments to Title VII, did not refer to this
legislative history.
105. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
106. Id. at 570-71.
107. Id. at 572-73.
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defendant's concession that plaintiffs were fully qualified,108 and
even though the Court relied heavily on a disparate impact/busi-
ness necessity analysis in reaching its result, the Court refused
even to consider whether liability could be established under plain-
tiffs' alternative theory of disparate impact.109 The importance of
Furnco is not merely the Court's failure to suggest standards for
determining when disparate impact or disparate treatment is the
appropriate analytical approach for a particular discrimination
case; the decision is also notable because it suggests that the same
set of operative facts may yield a different outcome on liability de-
pending upon which discrimination theory a court chooses to
use.110
A more profound result of the tension between the two theo-
ries can be found in the Court's construction of section 703(h) of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compen-
sation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to
a bona fide seniority or merit system ... provided that such differences are
not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin, nor shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an
108. Id. at 576 ("Furnco has conceded that [plaintiffs] were qualified in every respect
for the jobs which were about to be open.").
109. Id. at 580-81.
110. In City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 709
(1978), the Court held that "the basic policy of [Title VII] requires that we focus on fairness
to individuals rather than fairness to classes." Later, in Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567 (1978), the Court analyzed a disparate treatment case and stated that "[i]t is clear
beyond cavil that the obligation imposed by Title VII is to provide an equal opportunity for
each applicant regardless of race, without regard to whether members of the applicant's race
are already proportionately represented in the work force." Id. at 579 (emphasis in original).
Some courts have read this portion of Furnco to deemphasize the use of statistics in dispa-
rate treatment cases, even though the Court sanctioned their use in McDonnell Douglas.
See, e.g., EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980). See generally Belton,
supra note 2.
The problem is most dramatically illustrated in cases in which the question of qualifica-
tions is at issue. A question often considered by the courts, for example, is whether a plain-
tiff or defendant has the burden on the "best qualified" issue when it seems clear that plain-
tiff meets the basic qualification standard. Disparate treatment analysis may suggest that
the plaintiff must show that he or she is the best qualified to establish a prima facie case.
See Holder v. Old Ben Coal Co., 618 F.2d 1198 (7th Cir. 1980). Disparate impact analysis,
on the other hand, may require defendant to show that plaintiff is not the best qualified.
See id. at 1203 (Swygert, J., dissenting). Compare Holder v. Old Ben Coal Co., 618 F.2d
1198 (7th Cir. 1980) with Davis v. Weidner, 596 F.2d 726 (7th Cir. 1979). Moreover, there
are disagreements among courts within the various circuits on the appropriate analytical
approach to many of the discrimination cases. See, e.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co.,
634 F.2d 744 (4th Cir. 1980); Smith v. University of N.C., 632 F.2d 316 (4th Cir. 1980); Davis
v. Califano, 613 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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employer to give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed
ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the re-
sults is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color,
sex or national origin.""'
The Court in Griggs construed this section as a congressional man-
date to adopt the disparate impact theory when, for example, pro-
fessionally developed ability tests are at issue; therefore, a plaintiff
need not prove intent to discriminate.1 1 2 In Teamsters v. United
States,113 however, the Court construed this same section to re-
quire proof of intent to discriminate in cases which deal with
claims that seniority systems are unlawful under Title VII. The
two lines of cases derive from the same statutory language, which
speaks in terms of intent on both testing and seniority. The
Supreme Court, however, has adopted different theories of dis-
crimination for the two categories of claims. The Court has not at-
tempted to resolve this inconsistency; indeed, it does not even
seem to recognize that it exists.
Finally, there is yet one other important problem that is mani-
fest in the two statutory theories. The defendant's basic defense to
a disparate impact claim is the business necessity or job-related-
ness doctrine; his basic defense to a disparate treatment claim,
however, is the loosely defined doctrine of a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason. The courts have developed several well-defined
models of business necessity;114 but they have not attempted to
111. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976) (emphasis
added).
112. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
113. 431 U.S. 324, 343-56 (1977); accord, California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S.
948 (1980).
114. The business necessity defense, one of the major defenses in discrimination cases,
also has its doctrinal foundations in Griggs. The Court in Griggs stated that "[t]he Act
proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discrim-
inatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which
operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice
is prohibited." 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). The business necessity defense is not mentioned
specifically in the statutory language of Title VII. It was developed out of an interpretation
of section 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976), which exempts the use of professionally
developed ability tests unless they are administered or used in a manner that is intended or
designed to discriminate on the basis of one of the prohibited criteria. See B. Scm.m & P.
GRossmAN, supra note 4, at 45.
The Supreme Court has not attempted to define the contours of the business necessity
defense. It is clear, however, that the defense is not limited to the kind of practices which
were under scrutiny in Griggs. Thus, for example, the Court applied a variant of the defense
in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 (1977), which was a sex discrimination case that
dealt with height and weight requirements for jobs in a prison system.
The leading statement of the doctrine is found in Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d
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provide explicit criteria for the doctrine of a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason, even though the Supreme Court has held that
disparate treatment is the "most obvious evil that Congress had in
mind when it enacted Title VII.11 5 The seminal disparate treat-
ment case, McDonnell Douglas, merely provided one example of
an acceptable legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for disparate
treatment, namely, that an employer may refuse to hire a member
of a protected class if that person has engaged in illegal activity
directed at the employer.
2. Purposeful Discrimination: The Constitutional Cases
After Griggs a number of lower courts adopted the disparate
impact analysis in discrimination cases that were brought under
the equal protection clause of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments. " 6 The Supreme Court, however, reversed this trend in
Washington v. Davis117 when it made clear that the Griggs statu-
tory disparate impact test is not applicable to constitutional
claims. Rejecting the court of appeals' holding that a finding of
disparate impact made out a prima facie constitutional violation,
the Court in Washington held that because "[t]he central purpose
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of
race,"118 official action is not unconstitutional "solely because it
791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971), in which the court construed Griggs
and other lower court decisions on business necessity and held that
[c]ollectively these cases conclusively establish that the applicable test is not merely
whether there exists a business purpose for adhering to a challenged practice. The test
is whether there exists an overriding legitimate business purpose such that the practice
is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business. Thus, the business pur-
pose must be sufficiently compelling to override any racial impact; the challenged prac-
tice must effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve; and there
must be available no acceptable alternative policies or practices which would better
accomplish the business purpose advanced, or accomplish it equally well with a lesser
differential racial impact.
Id. at 798 (footnotes omitted). Under this formulation of the business necessity test, it is the
defendant's burden to show the absence of acceptable alternative practices. But see Al-
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
115. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). One commentator has
argued that the loosely defined defense of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is an ex-
tension of the "just cause" defense in labor law union contract cases. Blumrosen, Strangers
No More: All Workers Are Entitled To "Just Cause" Protection Under Title VII, 2 LAB.
REL. L.J. 519 (1978).
116. See, e.g., cases cited in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244 n.12 (1976).
117. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
118. Id. at 239.
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has a racially disproportionate impact."119 The Court held that the
plaintiff instead must show a "racially discriminatory purpose" 20
as part of his prima facie case.
121
The Supreme Court has never fully explored the parameters of
the constitutional discriminatory purpose requirement. In Wash-
ington v. Davis the Court said merely that "an invidious discrimi-
natory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the rele-
vant facts .... It is also not infrequently true that the
discriminatory impact ... may for all practical purposes demon-
strate unconstitutionality because in various circumstances the dis-
crimination is very difficult to explain on nonracial grounds.
M 22
Later, the Court in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney2 5 coupled
its rejection of a foreseeability test with the following statement:
"[Discriminatory purpose] implies that the decisionmaker. . . se-
lected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part
'because of' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an
119. Id.
120. Id. The Court noted that "[wie have never held that the constitutional standard
for adjudicating claims of invidious racial discrimination is identical to the standard appli-
cable under Title VII, and we decline to do so today." Id. The Court did say, however, that
"[d]isproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious
racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution." Id. at 242.
The more recent developments of the requirement to show purposeful or intentional
discrimination in equal protection cases had their genesis in the school desegregation cases.
See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973). Thereafter, the Supreme Court
extended the requirement to embrace all claims based on the equal protection clause. See,
e.g., Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
The Davis standard of purposeful discrimination has been described as an "impact-plus"
test. Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 140 (3d Cir. 1977).
Prior to Davis, a number of courts generally had assumed that the analytical approach
to claims under Title VII was applicable in constitutional cases. Discriminatory practices
having a disparate impact on a protected class were held unlawful-regardless of in-
tent-unless they were justified by business necessity. See 426 U.S. at 244-45, 244 n.12.
The lower courts are split on the issue whether discrimination claims under § 1981 and
§ 1982 are subject to the constitutional purposeful discrimination analysis or the proof stan-
dards established in the statutory cases. Indeed, Justice Powell's dissent in County of Los
Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 636 (1979), observed that the case presented "the important
question-heretofore unresolved by this Court-whether cases brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1981, like those brought directly under the Fourteenth Amendment, require proof of racially
discriminatory intent or purpose." Id. at 637; see Gay v. Local No. 30, 489 F. Supp. 282,
299-300 n.18 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (collecting cases on both interpretations of § 1981).
121. See Whiting v. Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116, 121 (5th Cir. 1980) (burden of
proof does not shift under the constitutional standard until the plaintiff has made out a
prima facie case of discriminatory purpose).
122. 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
123. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
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identifiable group. 1 24 Feeney is uncontrovertible to the extent
that it suggests the need for some kind of causal relationship in
discrimination cases. If the "because of" standard is construed lit-
erally, however, it seems to require a very particular kind of causa-
tion-a sine qua non relationship between the defendant's conduct
and the plaintiffs injury. It also implies that a showing of a very
particular kind of motivation is required in discrimination
cases-animus, a desire to harm.
B. The Burdens of Proof: A Two- Or Three-Step "Judicial
Minuet"?
Intimately related to the causation issue is the allocation of
the burdens of proof. As a general rule, plaintiffs in civil actions
have the ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of causa-
tion.125 It is on this issue that the allocation of the burdens of proof
becomes critically important. The Supreme Court has adopted dif-
ferent rules for the allocation of the burdens of proof in statutory
and constitutional cases; the Court has not, however, provided a
satisfactory reason for these differences.
1. The Statutory Cases
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,126 a disparate treatment
case, is the Court's seminal treatment of the burdens allocation is-
sue. The Court in McDonnell Douglas established a three-step for-
mulation that courts generally have applied in the statutory cases.
First, the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima
facie disparate treatment case of discrimination. 127 Second, if the
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to
the defendant to "articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son" that explains his conduct. 28 Assuming the defendant meets
this burden, the plaintiff, in stage three, must be given the oppor-
tunity to prove that the defendant's presumptively valid justifica-
tion was in fact merely a pretext for discriminatory conduct. 29
Three years after McDonnell Douglas, the disparate treatment
three-step formula was adopted in the disparate impact cases, de-
spite the implication in Griggs that a two-step approach applies
124. Id. at 279.
125. W. PROSSER, supra note 81.
126. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
127. Id. at 802.
128. Id. at 802 (emphasis added).
129. Id. at 804.
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under this theory.130 The Court in Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody'5 ' held that a plaintiff in a disparate impact case has the
initial burden of establishing a prima facie case which proves that
the defendant's policy or practice has a substantial impact on
members of a protected class. The burden then shifts to the defen-
dant to prove that the practice is mandated by business necessity
or that the practice has a manifest relationship to the defendant's
business. If the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff then
must be given the opportunity to show that other practices or poli-
cies with a lesser differential impact on the protected class would
serve the defendant's legitimate interest."2
The allocation of the burdens of proof in this line of cases left
many questions unanswered. First, the Court did not state whether
a prima facie case under either the disparate impact or the dispa-
rate treatment theory creates an inference or a presumption of dis-
crimination. The characterization of the prima facie case either as
an inference or as a presumption has important consequences in
any burdens of proof allocation analysis. If a prima facie case cre-
ates an inference of discrimination, and the defendant neither re-
buts the plaintiff's evidence nor introduces any independent evi-
dence of justification, a court could-but would not be required
to-find in the plaintiff's favor.13 8 If, however, a prima facie case
establishes a presumption, a court under these circumstances ar-
guably would be required to find for the plaintiff.'3 ' Unfortunately,
130. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
131. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
132. Id. at 425. The courts have applied this approach under the various statutory
prohibitions against discrimination in a wide range of cases. See cases cited note 89 supra.
133. See notes 63-70 supra and accompanying text. See also Legille v. Dann, 544 F.2d
1, 5 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (an inference is a conclusion that the trier of fact is permitted, but
not compelled, to draw from the facts). Inference analysis of the prima facie case would be
similar to the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, which means that the facts of
the occurrence warrant the inference but do not compel it. See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v.
Walters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978); Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233, 240 (1913); Prosser,
supra note 70. In Furnco the Court noted that a prima facie case is not the equivalent of an
"ultimate finding of fact as to discriminatory" conduct. But see Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981).
134. A presumption, sometimes called a presumption of law, is an inference that the
law directs the trier of fact to make if it finds a given set of facts. See notes 63-70 supra and
accompanying text. See also Legille v. Dann, 544 F.2d 1, 5 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1976); C. McCoR-
MCcK, supra note 3. Courts have used a presumption analysis even in those civil rights cases
in which intentional discrimination must be shown. See Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 359 n.45 (1977); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208-09 (1973); Williams
v. Anderson, 562 F.2d 1081, 1087-89 (8th Cir. 1977). Perhaps a major reason why the courts
tend to use the terms "presumption" and "inference" interchangeably is because there is
general agreement that the term "presumption" "is the slipperiest member of the family of
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courts have used both terms to characterize the weight of prima
facie cases under all theories of discrimination in statutory and
constitutional cases.
1 35
A second question remaining after these three cases concerns
the Court's adoption of the "articulate" standard to describe the
defendant's burden of proving the defense of the legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason in disparate treatment cases. This distinc-
tion between "articulate" and "prove" has been the source of much
confusion on the burdens allocation issue. Some courts have em-
phasized the Court's choice of the term "articulate" instead of
"prove" and imposed upon the defendant only the burden of pro-
ducing evidence on the question of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
justification. 138 Other courts have reasoned that assigning such a
minimal burden to the defendant is meaningless and have held
that the prima facie case still shifts the burden of persuasion to
the defendant.13 7 Thus, to prevail under this latter view a defen-
dant has to prove-by a preponderance of the evidence-that a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation supported its action.
The Supreme Court discussed the burdens of proof issue again
in two opinions rendered in 1978. Both were analyzed under the
disparate treatment theory. In Furnco Construction Corp. v. Wa-
ters3 8 the Court affirmed the court of appeals' ruling that plain-
tiffs had established a prima face case under the McDonnell Doug-
legal terms, except its first cousin, 'burden of proof.'" C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at 802-
03; see notes 247-69 infra and accompanying text.
135. Indeed, the Supreme Court has characterized the prima facie case as a presump-
tion and an inference in the same opinion. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 342,
361, 359 n.45 (1977). But see Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S. Ct. 1089,
1094 (1981). See also Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (statutory
case-inference); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) (constitutional
case-presumption); Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 693 (6th Cir.
1979) (inference); Williams v. Anderson, 562 F.2d 1081, 1087 (8th Cir. 1977) (presumption);
Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 826 (8th Cir. 1974) (housing-inference).
136. See, e.g., Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150, 1155-56 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 984 (1978); Barnes v. St. Catherine's Hosp., 563 F.2d 324, 329 (7th Cir. 1977);
Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277, 1281-82 (7th Cir. 1977); Harper v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 525 F.2d 409, 411 (8th Cir. 1975); Sabol v. Snyder, 524 F.2d 1009, 1012
(10th Cir. 1975); Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 347-48 (10th Cir. 1975); Gates
v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 492 F.2d 292, 295-96 (9th Cir. 1974); Croker v. Boeing Co., 437 F.
Supp. 1138, 1182-83 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
137. See, e.g., Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240, 1245-46 n.45 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Turner v.
Texas Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251, 1255 (5th Cir. 1977); Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze
Co., 541 F.2d 394, 399 (3d Cir. 1976). See also Sweeney v. Board of Trustees of Keene State
College, 569 F.2d 169 (1st Cir.), vacated and remanded, 439 U.S. 24 (1978); Vuyanich v.
Republic Nat'l Bank, No. CA-3-6982-G, slip op. at 2 n.3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 1981).
138. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
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las standard. The Court then attempted to explain the burdens
that shifted to defendant:
When the prima facie case is understood in light of the opinion in Mc-
Donnell Douglas, it is apparent that the burden which shifts to the [defen-
dant] is merely that of proving that he based his ... decision on a legitimate
consideration and not an illegitimate one .... To dispel the adverse infer-
ence from a prima facie [case] under McDonnell Douglas, the [defendant]
need only "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason."", 9
The imprecise analysis used by the Court in Furnco failed to
clarify the burdens of proof issue. Instead of attempting to resolve
the conflict among the lower courts, the Court even further begged
the question by using both "articulate" and "prove" in the same
paragraph. It can be argued that the Court meant that the two
terms are synonymous and interchangeable, and that it intended to
impose the burden of persuasion on a defendant asserting a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory defense in the same way that Griggs
seems to have imposed this burden on the business necessity de-
fense in disparate impact cases.140 Furnco, however, contained no
discussion about the scope and extent of the defendant's burden,
nor did it specifically recognize the conflict in the lower courts.
Several months after Furnco, the Court in Board of Trustees
of Keene State College v. Sweeney141 again faced the question of
the articulate/prove distinction. The Supreme Court stated that
the lower court's opinion read McDonnell Douglas to require the
defendant to prove the absence of discriminatory motive, 42 even
though the lower court had also held that "the ultimate burden of
persuasion on the issue of discrimination remains with the plain-
tiff, who must convince the court by a preponderance of the evi-
dence" that she has been a victim of unlawful discrimination.143
The Court, in a five-to-four per curiam opinion, vacated the deci-
sion, holding that
[w]hile words such as "articulate," "show," and "prove," may have more
or less similar meanings depending upon the context in which they are used,
we think that there is a significant distinction between merely "articulat[ing]
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" and "prov[ing] absence of dis-
criminatory motive." By reaffirming and emphasizing the McDonnell Douglas
139. Id. at 577-78 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
140. See, e.g., Silberhorn v. General Iron Works Co., 584 F.2d 970, 971 (10th Cir. 1978)
(construing McDonnell Douglas and Furnco as shifting to the defendant the obligation to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence its legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason).
141. 439 U.S. 24 (1978).
142. Id. at 25.
143. Id. at 27 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Sweeney v. Board of Trustees of Keene
State College, 569 F.2d 169, 177 (1st Cir. 1978)).
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analysis in Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, we made it clear that the
former will suffice to meet the [plaintiff's] prima facie case of discrimina-
tion.... The Court of Appeals appears to have imposed a heavier burden on
the [defendant] than Furnco warrants .... "I
Thus, the Court in Sweeney tacitly acknowledged that its own ear-
lier choice of terminology was the source of confusion in the lower
courts about the allocation of the burdens of proof. The Court ad-
hered to its "articulation" standard and stated clearly that this
standard does not impose as heavy a burden of proof on a defen-
dant as the lower court's standard. By asserting its adherence to
the "articulate" language in McDonnell Douglas without more
clearly defining a defendant's exact burden on his defenses, the
Court only perpetuated the already prevalent ambiguity and un-
certainty surrounding the burdens allocation problem.145
The four dissenting Justices in Sweeney, in an opinion by Jus-
tice Stevens, did not directly confront the confusion that McDon-
nell Douglas had spawned; they did make some effort, however, to
separate more clearly and consider an important aspect of the is-
sue. The dissent stated that it could find no operative distinction
between the terms "prove" and "articulate" because both terms
contemplate the presentation of evidence rather than the mere al-
legation of a nondiscriminatory purpose.14  Nevertheless, the dis-
144. Id. at 25 (citations omitted).
145. See sources cited notes 4 and 11 supra. It is far from clear, however, that the
lower courts were not influenced by the Sweeney articulation standard when deciding cases
under the disparate impact theory. In Lignons v. Bechtel Power Corp., 625 F.2d 771 (8th
Cir. 1980), for example, the court relied upon the Sweeney standard and seemed to apply
variants of both the disparate impact and disparate treatment theories. The court used a
disparate impact analysis to uphold a district court finding of a prima facie case, but it used
a disparate treatment rationale to hold that defendant had rebutted the prima facie case.
Compare Burdine v. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs, 608 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1979) (the
defendant must show legitimate nondiscriminatory business reason by preponderance of the
evidence), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981) with Grano v. Department of Dev., 637 F.2d 1073,
1080 n.4 (6th Cir. 1980) and Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 65 n.7 (2d Cir. 1980). See also
Otero v. Mesa County Valley School Dist., 470 F. Supp. 326 (D. Colo. 1979).
146. 439 U.S. at 28-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissenting Justices in Sweeney
examined the ways in which the per curiam opinion differed from their own viewpoint. They
identified two grounds: (1) "Articulate" must mean something more than "prove," and (2)
what the employer must "articulate" is simply a legitimate reason and not the "real reason
for the employment decision." They argued, however, that articulation in a trial context
amounts to proving a fact, and that any showing of a nondiscriminatory reason "simultane-
ously demonstrat[es] that the action was not motivated by an illegitimate factor such as
race." Id. at 29. The majority "agreed" with the dissenters' definition of defendant's burden
to the extent that it was "satisfied if he simply 'explains what he has done' or 'produc[es]
evidence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons.'" Id. at 25 n.2 (quoting dissent at 28-29).
Some courts appear to believe that the Court in Sweeney was unanimous in its view of
the obligation that shifted to the defendant. See, e.g., Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 65
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senters failed to provide any more meaningful guidance on the
burdens of proof issue than the majority. The dissent's deficiency,
like the majority's, lies in their failure to define clearly the scope
and extent of the defendant's burden. Moreover, the dissenters
also failed to specify whether the defendant must prove his defense
by a preponderance of the evidence or some lesser standard.
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine1 47 is the
Court's latest attempt to clarify the burdens allocation problem. In
Burdine the Court expressly limited its decision to the narrow
question whether a prima facie case under the disparate treatment
theory shifts the burden to the defendant to persuade the court by
a preponderance of the evidence on a defense of a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason.148 In responding to this narrow question,
however, the Court added an additional requirement to the prima
facie doctrine first announced in McDonnell Douglas: "[T]he,
plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the
evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. 1 49 The requirement
that the prima facie case must be proven by a preponderance of
the evidence is a novel requirement in burdens allocation analysis.
Generally, a prima facie case can be established if a plaintiff meets
his burden of producing evidence.1 50 The adoption of the prepon-
derance of the evidence test to determine whether a prima facie
case has been established suggests a high threshold requirement
and seems to be inconsistent with the Court's earlier pronounce-
ments.15' The adoption of this new test may be inadvertent, or it
may portend an important shift in the manner of deciding discrim-
ination cases. In either event, this choice of words is not likely to
eliminate the confusion or contribute to the development of a co-
herent framework for future cases.
Notwithstanding this novel approach to the prima facie case
doctrine, the real significance of Burdine lies in its treatment of
the burden that shifts to the defendant after a prima facie case has
been established. On this point the Court attempted to explicate in
some detail the nature of the burden:
[I]f the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to
(2d Cir. 1980).
147. 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981).
148. Id. at 1092.
149. Id. at 1091.
150. See Cleary, supra note 30, at 7; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 338.
151. See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 972 (1973).
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the defendant "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
[his action]".
The burden that shifts to the defendant, therefore, is to rebut the pre-
sumption of discrimination by producing evidence that the plaintiff was re-
jected, or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son. The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually
motivated by the proffered reasons .... It is sufficient if the defendant's evi-
dence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the
plaintiff.151
Although Burdine makes clear that only the production burden
shifts to the defendant, the Court identified some of the factors
that must be considered in determining the sufficiency of the de-
fendant's evidence. First, the defendant must clearly set forth,
through the introduction of legally sufficient evidence, the reasons
for his action. Second, an articulation that is not admitted into evi-
dence will not be sufficient. Third, the defendant's burden cannot
be met through an answer to the complaint or an argument by his
counsel.115 Fourth, the articulation must be legally sufficient to jus-
tify a judgment in the defendant's favor.1 " Last, the defendant's
explanation of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason must be
clear and reasonably specific.155
The Court in Burdine rejected the court of appeals' construc-
tion that Sweeney placed upon the defendant the burden of per-
suasion to prove a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The lower
court had read Sweeney this way because it feared that "[i]f an
employer need only to articulate-not prove-a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for his action, he may compose fictitious, but
legitimate, reasons for his actions. '"5 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, reaffirmed its McDonnell Douglas articulation standard and
rejected the rationale of the court of appeals on the ground that
limiting the defendant's evidentiary burden on this standard would
not unduly hinder the plaintiff. The Court set forth several reasons
for this reasoning. First, the requirement that the defendant's ar-
ticulation be clear and reasonably specific imposes upon him an
obligation to rebut the prima facie case and provides the plaintiff
152. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S. Ct. at 1093, 1094.
153. Id. at 1094 & n.9.
154. Id. For a discussion of legally sufficient evidence, see Lubbock Feed Lots, Inc. v.
Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 630 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1980); Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d
365 (5th Cir. 1969); James, Sufficiency of the Evidence and Jury Control Devices Available
Before Verdict, 47 VA. L. REv. 218 (1961).
155. 101 S. Ct. at 1094, 1096.
156. Id. at 1096 (citations omitted) (brackets in original).
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with a "full and fair opportunity" to demonstrate pretext. Second,
the defendant will have an incentive to persuade the factfinder
that his action was lawful even though he does not have the formal
burden of persuasion. Last, the liberal rules of discovery allow the
plaintiff to test out the defendant's asserted legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason defense. 157 The concern of the court of appeals
seems to have been legitimized in Burdine, however, when the
Court stated that "[t]he defendant need not persuade the court
that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. 15 8 This
statement is perhaps the most disturbing point in the case because
it suggests that the defendant need not prove the "real reason" for
his action even if improper criteria were used.
159
The Court in Burdine also expanded upon the plaintiff's obli-
gation to demonstrate pretext. The plaintiff retains the burden of
persuasion on the issue of discrimination, but this burden merges
with the plaintiff's obligation to prove pretext should the defen-
dant meet his burden of producing evidence under the articulation
standard. Thus, the plaintiff can prevail on the ultimate issue of
liability either directly, by persuading the factfinder that a dis-
criminatory reason more likely than not motivated the defendant,
or indirectly, by showing that the defendant's asserted justification
defense is unworthy of credence. 60
The Court in Burdine also held that a prima facie case creates
a presumption of discrimination and that "if the [defendant re-
mains] silent in the face of [this] presumption, [the] court must
enter judgment for the plaintiff." ' The Court, however, adopted
the presumption characterization of a prima facie case that creates
only a rebuttable presumption; it specifically rejected the pre-
sumption analysis that permits the factfinder to infer the ultimate
fact at issue.1 6 2 For this proposition the Court simply cited to rule
301 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 63 Rule 301 has been a
source of controversy in the analysis of presumptions since its
adoption, and it raises a very difficult and complex statutory con-
struction problem.1 The failure of the Court to confront this stat-
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1094 (emphasis added).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1095.
161. Id. at 1094.
162. Id. at 1094 & n.7.
163. Id. at 1094 n.8.
164. See notes 271-95 infra and accompanying text.
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utory construction problem is one of the basic defects in its analy-
sis in Burdine.
Burdine may have clarified some of the confusion that the ear-
lier cases had created, but the Court again failed to offer an overall
framework for analyzing the burdens allocation problem in future
cases or under other theories of discrimination. Burdine appears to
have implicitly rejected the majority's opinion in Sweeney, even
though the Court cites to Sweeney as if it fully supports the Bur-
dine result.1 6 5 A comparison of the majority and dissenting opin-
ions in Sweeney and the unanimous opinion in Burdine, however,
demonstrates that the Court is still struggling with the problem of
devising an appropriate and comprehensive framework on burdens
allocation in discrimination cases.
The McDonnell Douglas articulate/prove distinction has not
been formally adopted in the disparate impact cases. Few courts, if
any, have held in these cases that a defendant's obligation is
merely to "articulate" a business necessity rationale;166 rather, the
standard appears to be that the defendant has the obligation to
"prove" business necessity by a preponderance of the evidence.167
Even in the disparate impact class of cases, however, the courts
have neither clearly nor uniformly enunciated a coherent frame-
work on burdens of proof allocation. Some courts have construed
Griggs to stand for the proposition that defendants have both the
burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion on the
issue of business necessity.166 This reading of Griggs adopts a two-
165. See 101 S. Ct. at 1093, 1094. If Sweeney is still good law-and Burdine suggests
that it is-then it is unclear whether the majority or the minority in Sweeney changed its
position to make Burdine a unanimous decision. The holding in Burdine that a defendant
need not persuade the court that he was motivated by the proffered reason suggests that the
dissenters in Sweeney accepted the majority's position that a quantifiable distinction does
in fact exist between the obligation "to articulate" and the obligation "to prove."
166. See note 114 supra.
167. In Griggs the Court held that "the touchstone is business necessity." 401 U.S.
424, 431 (1971). "More than that," the Court stated, "Congress has placed on the employer
the burden of showing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the
employment in question." Id. at 432. See also Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d
1007, 1015 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The employer's burden of proving job-relatedness to rebut a
claim of disparate impact is greater than its burden of merely showing a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason in response to a claim of discriminatory treatment."); James v. Stock-
ham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 330 (5th Cir. 1977) ("Once the plaintiff... has
presented a prima facie case of discrimination, the 'onus of going forward with the evidence
and the burden of persuasion' is on the defendant."); Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34 (5th Cir.
1974) (defendant has burden of proof on bona fide occupational qualification).
168. See, e.g., Kirby v. Colony Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 696, 703-04 (8th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Local 169, 457 F.2d 210, 214 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 851 (1972);
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step approach on burdens of proof allocation in disparate impact
cases. 169 After Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,170 however, a case
that seemed to adopt the McDonnell Douglas disparate treatment
three-step approach in a disparate impact case, the lower courts
have reached divergent results on the burden that shifts to the de-
fendant. Some courts have held that the plaintiff has the burden of
proof on the existence of an alternative policy and practice that
would have a lesser differential impact on the protected class.
171
United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 551 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
984 (1971); Johnson v. Pike Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 490, 495 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
169. Although the court does not articulate its holding in exactly these terms, the
leading case in support of this position is Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971), in which the court construed the Griggs business
necessity rationale to impose upon defendants the burden to prove, among other things, the
absence of alternative policies that would have a lesser differential impact on opportunities
for members of a protected class. See New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587
& n.31 (1979) (suggesting that the showing of job-relatedness of a challenged practice ends
further inquiry); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331, 333 (1977) (defendant has the
burden of proving the statutory bona fide occupational qualification exception) (citing with
approval, Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1971)). See
also Head v. Timkin Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 877 (6th Cir. 1973) (reversible error
to allocate burden of showing absence of alternative methods to plaintiff); United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971).
170. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
171. In light of Furnco, the Moody Court's application of the analysis used in McDon-
nell Douglas has been interpreted to broaden the discretion of trial courts. In Burwell v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 372 n.18 (4th Cir. 1980), for example, a majority of the
court noted,
The concept of pretext as a part of the plaintiffs proof was first recognized in
McDonnell Douglas, supra, a disparate treatment case. In Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405... (1975), a disparate impact case, the Supreme Court charac-
terized this rebuttal phase of a plaintiffs case by stating: "[I]t remains open to the
complaining party to show that other tests or selection devices, without a similarly
undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate interest in 'efficient
and trustworthy workmanship."' [The Court went on to state that such a showing
would be evidence of employer "pretext."] Since this is essentially equivalent to one
element of the Lorillard business necessity test, it might appear that the scheme of
proof implicit in Lorillard, supra, absorbs the "pretext" function in disparate impact/
business necessity cases. Subjective motivation of the employer plays no role in deter-
mining whether "business necessity" is a legitimate defense. It would seem, since "pre-
text" is subjective in nature, it would not be part of the scheme of proof in disparate
impact cases. The Supreme Court, however, appeared to use it in that context in Al-
bemarle. I would not approve or disapprove its use here. The legitimacy of Eastern's
"business necessity" must be decided from objective facts. If a district court, however,
wishes to view the fact from different perspectives, it should not be inhibited by se-
mantic obstacles from using any tool that might be helpful in resolving these difficult
legal/factual questions. In light of the Furnco-announced elasticity of analysis, a trial
court should not be formalistically precluded from utilizing pretext even in disparate
impactcases if viewing the employer's actions from that perspective contributes to the
objective understanding of whether the practice is necessary.
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Other courts have held that the defendants have the burden of
persuasion on this issue; that this defense must be demonstrated
by a clear and convincing standard;172 and that proof by the plain-
tiff of alternative approaches simply means that the defendant has
not carried his burden.17 3 Moreover, this confusion and conflict on
burdens of proof allocation in the disparate impact cases is mani-
fest not only between the circuits, but also within them. 74
The Supreme Court has not faced this problem in the dispa-
rate impact cases squarely, but the implications in its decisions
suggest divergent results. Even though the Court seems to have
adopted the McDonnell Douglas three-step approach in disparate
impact cases, there are indications that the issue is still in doubt. A
footnote in McDonnell Douglas, for example, suggests that the
Court was not deciding this question as it applies to disparate im-
pact cases.175 Later, however, the Court appears to have decided
precisely this question in Moody. On the other hand, the Court in
Burdine specifically noted that it was addressing only the "narrow
question" of the allocation of the burdens of proof in disparate
treatment cases 7 1 and-notwithstanding Moody-implicitly sug-
gested that a different burdens of proof allocation might be appli-
cable in a disparate impact case.'
Although the Griggs disparate impact theory has not been re-
pudiated, several recent cases suggest that defendants may have a
lighter burden on business necessity than earlier cases seemed to
172. Some courts impose the higher standard of proof on defendants under the busi-
ness necessity doctrine. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 582 F.2d 827 (3d
Cir. 1978) ("convincing evidence"); Richardson v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Health, 561 F.2d
489 (3d Cir. 1977) ("probing judicial review"); United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d
415 (7th Cir. 1977) ("convincing proof"); Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083, 1086 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
173. See, e.g., Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007, 1018-20 (2d Cir. 1980);
Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1376-78 (9th Cir. 1979).
174. See cases cited note 11 supra.
175. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.14 (1973).
176. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1092 (1981).
177. Id. at 1093 n.5. The Court stated "[w]e have recognized that the factual issues,
and therefore the character of the evidence presented, differ when the plaintiff claims that a
facially neutral employment policy has a discriminatory impact on protected classes." Id.
(citations omitted).
The court in Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, No. CA-3-6982-G (N.D. Tex. Aug. 4,
1981), held that Burdine does not change the sequence of proof required in a Title VII class
action disparate impact case. The court held also that in a disparate impact case the plain-
tiff always has the burden of persuasion to prove impact, and the defendant always has the
burden of persuasion to prove the defense of business necessity on any practice that he has
relied upon to justify the impact. Id. at 7. Vuyanich is one of the few cases which explicitly
holds that the defendant has the burden of persuasion on the business necessity defense.
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impose. In New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer17 8 plain-
tiffs, representing a class of blacks and Hispanics, challenged de-
fendant's policy of limiting the employment opportunities of meth-
adone users. One of the theories upon which plaintiffs relied was
the disparate impact theory. The Supreme Court, in a six to three
decision, reversed the lower court decision that had ruled in favor
of plaintiffs. 17 '9 An analysis of Beazer through comparison with
prior cases suggests that it imposes a more onerous burden upon
plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case and a correspondingly
lighter burden on defendants to rebut plaintiffs' showing.
In Dothard v. Rawlinson,1 80 for example, a leading case on the
use of statistics in discrimination cases, a female applicant for the
position of prison guard challenged a state statute on the ground
that the height and weight requirements for the position of prison
guard excluded a disproportionate percentage of women. Plaintiff
introduced national statistics to show that a substantially smaller
percentage of women were employed as prison guards than were in
the total work force, and that, on the basis of national census sta-
tistics, the statute would exclude a far greater percentage of wo-
men than men. Defendant's rebuttal attacked plaintiff's reliance
upon national statistics, arguing that plaintiff should be required
to produce data about the actual applicants for the job. The Court
rejected defendant's position and declared that "[tihere is no re-
quirement. . . that a statistical showing of disproportionate im-
pact must always be based on analysis of the characteristics of ac-
tual applicants." ' The Court thus approved the reliance upon
general population statistics, provided there is no reason to believe
that the data did not reflect the characteristics of the relevant la-
bor market.
1 82
The Court in Beazer, however, applied a much more exacting
level of scrutiny to the absence of applicant flow data than it had
applied in Dothard. Specifically, the Court held in Beazer that the
city-wide statistics upon which plaintiffs relied were "virtually ir-
relevant" because the data failed to account for several variables
178. 440"U.S. 568 (1979).
179. Id. at 582-87. The Court also rejected plaintiffs' claim under the equal protection
clause on the ground that the exclusion of methadone users has a rational basis. Id. at 587-
94.
180. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).




that could skew the results.18 The Court reversed in Beazer even
though defendant offered no independent evidence from which it
could be inferred that the failure to account for these variables
would invalidate the conclusions drawn by the lower court. If the
analysis in Beazer were adopted as a general rule in disparate im-
pact cases, a defendant conceivably could rebut a prima facie case
on the ground that the plaintiff failed to introduce applicant flow
data by merely "articulating" the existence of uncontrollable vari-
ables. If this analysis of Beazer is correct, then the burden imposed
upon a defendant after a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case
would be, in effect, the same as the "articulation" burden adopted
in the disparate treatment cases.""
2. The Constitutional Cases
The Supreme Court has adopted a different approach to the
burdens of proof allocation problem in constitutional discrimina-
tion cases. In Washington v. Davis1 85 the Court held that the stat-
utory disparate impact theory "involves a more probing judicial re-
view of, and less deference to, the seemingly reasonable acts of
administrators and executives than is appropriate under the Con-
stitution"; thus, the Court was "not disposed to adopt this more
rigorous standard" 18 6 in constitutional cases. It held, therefore,
that after a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, "the burden of
proof shifts to the State to rebut the presumption of unconstitu-
tional action by showing that permissible racially neutral selection
criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic
results.
1 87
The Davis approach was explicated further in Village of Ar-
lington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.1 88
Finding that plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima facie case,
183. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 586 (1979).
184. See Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1260-62, 1260 n.8
(6th Cir. 1981) (placing burden of persuasion on defendant to show alternative practice is
reversible error, if defendant's justification is not insufficient); Contreras v. City of Los An-
geles, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 866 (9th Cir. 1981) (placing burden on plaintiffs to prove
alternative methods). But see Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, No. CA-3-6982-G (N.D.
Tex. Aug. 4, 1981) (plaintiff in a disparate impact case is not required to offer, in stage
three, additional evidence of pretext to meet evidence offered by defendant that is ad-
dressed solely to an attack on plaintiff's prima facie case).
185. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
186. Id. at 247.
187. Id. at 241 (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972)).
188. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
19811 1247
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
the Court held that
[Washington v.] Davis does not require a plaintiff to prove that the chal-
lenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory purposes. Rarely can it
be said that a legislature or administrative body operating under a broad
mandate made a decision motivated solely by a single concern, or even that a
particular purpose was the "dominant" or "primary" one.2
89
Assuming that the plaintiff makes a threshold showing of a prima
facie case, therefore, the burden that shifts to the defendant under
the Arlington Heights analysis is the obligation to prove that the
same decision would have been made without any consideration of
an unconstitutional purpose.190
The Court made the constitutional approach even more ex-
plicit in another case decided the same day as Arlington Heights.
In Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v.
Doyle 91 plaintiff, an untenured teacher, alleged that defendant
had not renewed his contract for reasons that violated his pro-
tected rights under the first amendment. Defendant asserted two
reasons in refusing to renew plaintiff's contract: Plaintiff's use of
obscene language and gestures in the school cafeteria and his dis-
closure to a local radio station of a change in school board policies.
The district court, relying upon a substantial motive test, held that
defendant's reliance upon protected constitutional activity had
played a substantial part in defendant's decision and, therefore,
plaintiff was entitled to relief. The court of appeals affirmed, also
relying on an "in part" test. The Supreme Court, however, re-
versed, holding that
[a] rule of causation which focuses solely on whether protected conduct
played a part, "substantial" or otherwise, in a decision not to rehire, could
place an employee in a better position as a result of the exercise of constitu-
tionally protected conduct than he would have occupied had he done nothing.
The difficulty with the rule enunciated by the [lower court] is that it would
require reinstatement in cases where a dramatic and perhaps abrasive inci-
dent is inevitably on the minds of those responsible for the decision to rehire,
189. Id. at 265 (emphasis added).
190. The Arlington Heights Court stated,
Proof that the decision by the Village was motivated in part by a racially discrimi-
natory purpose would not necessarily have required invalidation of the challenged deci-
sion. Such proof would, however, have shifted to [defendant] the burden of establish-
ing that the same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not
been considered. If this were established, the [plaintiff] in a case of this kind no longer
fairly could attribute the injury complained of to improper consideration of a discrimi-
natory purpose. In such circumstances, there would be no justification for judicial in-
terference with the challenged decision.
Id. at 270-71 n.21 (emphasis added).
191. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
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and does indeed play a part in that decision-even if the same decision would
have been reached had the incident not occurred. The constitutional princi-
ple at stake is sufficiently vindicated if such an employee is placed in no
worse a position than if he had not engaged in the conduct.'
9 2
From this rationale, the Court fashioned the following rule on the
burdens of proof:
Initially ... the burden [is] properly placed upon the [plaintiff] to show
that his conduct was constitutionally protected, and that this conduct was a
"substantial factor"- or, to put it in other words, that it was a "motivating
factor" in the [defendant's] decision not to rehire him. [Plaintiff] having car-
ried that burden, however, the [court] should. . . determine whether the [de-
fendant] had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have
reached the same decision as to [plaintiffs] reemployment even in the ab-
sence of the protected conduct.' 3
Davis, Arlington Heights, and Mt. Healthy are significant in
several respects. First, unlike the statutory discrimination cases,
the Court established a two-step approach to burdens of proof allo-
cation. Initially, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case that
the discriminatory conduct was a "substantial" or "motivating"
factor in causing the injury claimed by the plaintiff. Once this is
accomplished, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the same decision would have
been reached even without any unconstitutional considerations.
Thus, these cases recognize that efforts to determine the "domi-
nant motive" or the "primary motive" is usually unavailing.1 9 4 Sec-
ond, the constitutional cases impose a burden of persuasion on the
defendant that is substantially heavier than the obligation to "ar-
ticulate" a legitimate reason for his decision. Third, if, as the Court
held in Davis, statutory claims of discrimination entail "a more
probing judicial" review, 19 5 the lighter burden imposed upon de-
fendants in statutory cases such as Burdine and Beazer do little to
encourage this heightened level of scrutiny. Last, the burden that
Mt. Healthy places upon the defendants is not really directed at
the prima facie case itself. Plainly, if a defendant can prove that
his decision was not motivated by unconstitutional considerations,
192. Id. at 285-86.
193. Id. at 287 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
194. See, e.g., id. at 287.
195. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247 (1976). The Davis Court suggested that a
claim of discrimination that may not be sustained under the more rigorous statutory stan-
dard may nevertheless be sustained under a constitutional challenge. Id. at 249. See Berg v.
La Crosse Cooler Co., 612 F.2d 1041, 1046 (7th Cir. 1980) ("[W]hat may not constitute dis-
crimination under the [constitution] may be discrimination under a statute"); Blake v. City
of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1378 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1979).
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he does not need to rely upon the Mt. Healthy rationale at all. If a
defendant is unable to show this absence of consideration, how-
ever, he has a second chance to escape liability under Mt. Healthy
by producing evidence and persuading the court that the same de-
cision would have been made even without the unconstitutional
consideration.
IV. BURDENS ALLOCATION: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
A. Elements of a Discrimination Case
A defendant may escape liability in one of two ways: He can
rebut any of the basic facts undergirding the plaintiff's prima facie
case, or he can prove any one of the specific statutory or judicially
created defenses. 196 Thus, characterizing an element as part of the
plaintiff's or the defendant's case can have important consequences
for the allocation of the burdens. For example, in Corning Glass
Works v. Brennan,197 an equal pay case, defendant originally had
segregated its work by sex-females were assigned to the day shift
and males to the night shift. The females were paid less than the
males. The issue before the Court was whether plaintiff had failed
to establish a prima facie case on the "equal work" element, since
liability does not attach unless a determination is made that une-
qual pay is being given for work performed "under similar working
conditions."' 9 8 Assuming that the working conditions were similar
and the pay unequal, liability could be imposed only if a finding
were made that the inequality was because of "a factor other than
sex."199 The Court, relying on the legislative history, held that the
shift assignments did not constitute a difference in "working con-
ditions."200 The important point in Corning Glass is not so much
the actual holding of the case but its implications for the allocation
of proof burdens. If the Court had held that the different shifts
constituted dissimilar working conditions, plaintiff would not have
made out a prima facie case, and defendant would have prevailed.
Since the Court held that the shift difference was irrelevant to the
"equal work" element, this difference could be considered only
under one of the exceptions to the general proscription against un-
196. See, e.g., Davis v. Califano, 613 F.2d 957, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Mosby v. Webster
College, 563 F.2d 901, 903-04 (8th Cir. 1977); Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'I Bank, No. CA-3-
6982-G (N.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 1981).
197. 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
198. Id. at 197.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 198-204.
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equal pay under similar working conditions. Defendant had relied
expressly upon the "any factor other than sex" exception, but the
Court rejected that section's applicability because the shift differ-
ence had its genesis in sex discrimination. Thus, Corning Glass
demonstrates that an ultimate finding of discrimination may turn
upon whether a legislature or a court deems an element to be part
of the plaintiff's or the defendant's case. 0 1
A court must receive evidence on the following four basic pro-
positions before it can reach an ultimate finding of discrimination:
(1) That the defendant made an adverse decision on the plaintiff's
asserted right in an activity in which discrimination is prohibited;
(2) that the plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (3) that a
causal relationship exists between the defendant's conduct and the
plaintiff's claim; and (4) that the claimed discriminatory conduct
does not fall within either a statutory or a judicially created excep-
tion.20 2 As a general rule, liability will not attach until a court
makes an ultimate finding on all four basic propositions.20 3
201. See Sullivan, The Equal Pay Act of 1963: Making and Breaking a Prima Facie
Case, 31 ARK. L. REV. 545, 548 (1978).
202. The courts in discrimination cases have not been consistent in assigning to one
party or the other the evidentiary burden on these four propositions. This Article makes
specific proposals for the assignment of these burdens. See notes 226-309 infra and accom-
panying text. See generally text accompanying note 31 supra.
203. The framework proposed here is applicable to both cbnstitutional and statutory
cases. Although there may be differences in the substantive standards under the various
laws, the basic distinction between the two categories appears to center on the element of
intent. Moreover, the courts have tended to apply the same substantive standards to both
categories of cases when intent is an element of the claim. See, e.g., Tanner v. McCall, 625
F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1980); Williams v. Anderson, 562 F.2d 1081, 1087 (8th Cir. 1977) (noting
the relationship between Title VII and § 1983 claims); United States v. City of Black Jack,
508 F.2d 1179, 1185 n.2 (8th Cir. 1975).
It appears, however, that the courts have imposed a greater burden of proof on the
defendants in some discrimination cases arising under the constitution and 42 U.S.C. §
1983. The Court in Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 209 (1973), for example, held a
defendant to the standard of justifying its conduct by a "clear and convincing" showing. See
also Jones v. Pitt County Bd. of Educ., 528 F.2d 414, 417 (4th Cir. 1975). The framework
offered here does not propose a change on the degree of persuasion because it appears that
this rule is grounded in constitutional considerations. The other proposals suggested in this
framework, however, would be applicable to this special class of cases.
Some courts have attempted to distinguish the constitutional cases from the statutory
disparate treatment cases on the ground that discriminatory motive may be a critical ele-
ment. See, e.g., Marshall v. Kirkland, 602 F.2d 1282, 1299 (8th Cir. 1979). The Court in
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), observed that "[ijt is also not infrequently true
that the discriminatory impact ... may for all practical purposes demonstrate unconstitu-
tionality because in various circumstances the discrimination is very difficult to explain on
nonracial grounds." Id. at 242. Thus, it appears that evidence of disparate impact under
some circumstances will by itself be sufficient to meet the constitutional purposeful discrim-
ination standard; therefore, in these situations the constitutional cases are not analytically
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
As we have seen, these propositions are subsumed under two
distinct substantive theories of discrimination: The disparate im-
pact theory and the disparate treatment theory.20 Moreover, in
addition to the statutory exceptions contained in the various pieces
of discrimination legislation,205 these two theories also have been
held to be subject to two judicially developed defenses: business
necessity and a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The basic de-
fense to a disparate impact claim is business necessity, and the
typical defense to a disparate treatment claim is a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason. 06 Moreover, both theories may be chal-
lenged with a statutory defense.
The analysis of these four basic propositions raises two funda-
mental questions: (1) Which party should have the burdens of
pleading, production, and persuasion on each of the substantive
theories and defenses? and (2) What is the applicable standard to
use in determining the causal connection between the plaintiff's
claim and the defendant's conduct? Although these two questions
are interrelated,0 7 the first question can be characterized as the
burdens of proof problem, and the second question can be charac-
terized as the causation problem. The "causation" problem is con-
sidered first not only because it is typically the most critical deter-
mination in a discrimination case, but also because it is the
determination to which the burdens of proof should be directed.
B. Causation: A "But For" Test
Causation in discrimination cases is a complex legal standard
that often also takes on the role of a factual conclusion. Courts
different from the statutory disparate impact cases. Justice White also has suggested that
under some circumstances the inquiry into discriminatory purpose may well be encom-
passed by the inquiry into discriminatory effect. Id. at 248. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430
U.S. 482 (1977) (disparate impact in the Texas "keyman" system of selecting grand jurors
held sufficient proof of discriminatory intent).
204. See notes 88-100 supra and accompanying text.
205. Statutory defenses are contained in the Equal Pay Act, of 1963, 29 U.S.C. §
206(d)(1)(iv) (1976) (protecting pay differentials based upon any factor other than sex); the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979) (bona
fide occupation qualification (BFOQ) defense-§ 623(f)); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. II 1978) (BFOQ defense-§ 2000e-2(e);
inability to reasonably accommodate without undue hardship defense-§ 2000e-20j)); bona
fide seniority system defense-§ 2000e-2(h); professionally developed ability test defense-§
2000e-2(h)); and the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1976) (bona fide individual
ability test defense-§ 2000d-2(h)).
206. See notes 114-15 supra and accompanying text; Ward v. Westland Plastics, Inc.,
651 F.2d 1266, 1268 (5th Cir. 1980).
207. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
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encounter considerable difficulty-particularly at the appellate
level-in deciding whether a finding of discriminatory purpose-or
its absence-is a conclusion of law, which is subject to plenary ex-
amination, or a finding of fact, which is subject only to a limited
standard of review.208 Some courts have astutely noted, however,
that the ultimate determination of discrimination vel non is prop-
erly characterized as a "mixed question of law and fact." 09 Even to
speak in terms of the intent of a defendant is to engage in some-
what of a legal fiction,210 since as a practical matter, the process of
decisionmaking quite often does not involve any intent whatsoever.
The concept of discrimination is a creation of the law, and, conse-
quently, the determination of which facts are relevant to an ulti-
mate finding of discrimination is likewise a matter of law. Simi-
larly, to the extent that a finding of a discriminatory purpose is a
factual conclusion, it is an "elusive" or "ultimate" fact.2 11 Like neg-
208. Many appellate decisions have characterized the issue of a defendant's motive in
discrimination cases as one of "ultimate fact" that is subject to plenary review. See, e.g.,
Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Assoc., 615 F.2d 1025, 1031 n.5 (5th Cir.
1980); Causey v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F.2d 416, 420-21 (5th Cir. 1975). On the other hand,
recent Supreme Court cases have treated the question of motivation in discrimination cases
as one of "subsidiary" fact, which is subject only to the "clearly erroneous" standard of
review. See, e.g., Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 512 n.6 (1980); Givhan v. Western Line
Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979). Unfortunately, in the majority of the cases, appel-
late courts do not articulate their standard of review at all. See Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 628
F.2d 488, 491 (5th Cir. 1980).
FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) provides that "findings of fact" in actions tried without a jury
"shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the oppor-
tunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." The Court has said that a
"finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
209. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 583 F.2d 882, 885 (6th Cir. 1978);
Causey v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1975).
210. The discriminatory purpose requirement occasionally referred to is in terms of
"intent" or "motive." While these terms might profitably be given slightly different shades
of meaning, they tend to be used indiscriminately by the courts and should be considered
equivalent for the purposes of discrimination cases. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 87, at 1217-21.
Cf. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 573 F.2d 400, 412 n.30 (7th Cir.) (the terms
"purpose" and "intent" must be distinguished from the word "motive," which usually refers
to an individual's subjective intent), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978); Feeney v. Commis-
sioner of Mass., 451 F. Supp. 143, 149-50 (D. Mass. 1978) (although "purpose" of the law
was to aid veterans, "intent" was to achieve that purpose by subordinating employment
opportunities of women), rev'd sub nom. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
211. "Ultimate facts" conventionally are thought of as final-and essentially conclu-
sive-inferences drawn frorii "basic facts." Causey v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F.2d 416, 420-21
(5th Cir. 1975). This concept can be found in diverse areas of the law-for example, the
traditional evidentiary rule that testimony about basic facts is allowed, but testimony about
ultimate facts-or "ultimate issues"-is not. See C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 3, § 12, at 26.
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ligence, discriminatory purpose can be determined only by apply-
ing legal standards to a large pool of "basic" or "historical"
facts.212 Furthermore, the kinds of evidence that are relevant to a
finding of an intent to discriminate usually will differ from the evi-
dence bearing on the intent, for example, of a criminal defendant,
since discrimination must, in most cases, be inferred from circum-
stantial evidence.2 s
As stated above, there is no clear consensus on the proper
standard of causation in discrimination cases. The standard has
been variously defined to require evidence that the claimed dis-
criminatory conduct played "some part," 1 ' or was "a factor, '215 "a
determining factor, ' 216 "a pretext,217 or "a substantial or motivat-
ing factor."218 Moreover, the courts seem to recognize that the ap-
plication of any of these standards can yield a different outcome
on the ultimate determination of discrimination.2 9
These various causation standards are in effect simply differ-
ent guises for articulating a modified standard that is akin to the
"but for" or a "substantial factor" rule adopted in tort cases. 20
212. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977). For this reason, the distinction between "ultimate facts" and conclusions of law
is occasionally hazy. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 396
(1948) (suggesting that even under clearly erroneous review less deference is given to find-
ings on "mixed questions of law and fact").
213. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979); Columbus Bd. of
Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
214. See, e.g., Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d 663, 665 (1st Cir. 1979).
215. See, e.g., Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344, 349-50 (7th Cir. 1971)
(impermissible criteria need not be sole factor).
216. See, e.g., Cova v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 574 F.2d 958, 960 (8th Cir. 1978) (plain-
tiff must "show that age was a determining factor"); Mastie v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 424
F. Supp. 1299, 1322 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (age must be a "determining factor" rather than "a
factor").
217. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973).
218. See Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 416-17 (1979);
Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284-87 (1977) (first
amendment violation); Sherkow v. Wisconsin, 630 F.2d 498, 502 (7th Cir. 1980) (Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 violation); Garcia v. Gloor, 609 F.2d 156, 160
(5th Cir. 1980) (violation of Title VII if forbidden reason is a "significant factor" in employ-
ment decision); Corley v. Jackson Police Dep't, 566 F.2d 994, 998-99 (5th Cir. 1978) (Title
VII violated if impermissible factor "significant" in making decision, even if permissible
factor could have justified decision).
219. A leading case that is often cited for these distinctions is Loeb v. Textron, Inc.,
600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979).
220. See W. PROSSER, supra note 81, § 41. In Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256
(1979), the Supreme Court refused to draw distinct lines of causation: "Discriminatory in-
tent is simply not amenable to calibration. It either is a factor that has influenced the legis-
lative choice or it is not." Id. at 277.
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This basic precept of tort law holds that "[t]he defendant's con-
duct is not a cause of the event, if the event would have occurred
without it. '2 2 1 Suppose, for example, that a hypothetical plaintiff
has only two years of college education, is over fifty years old, and
has a criminal record for draft resistance. He applies for a job and
is rejected by a hypothetical defendant. The plaintiff then brings
an action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,222
claiming that he was denied employment because of his age. The
defendant's evidence at trial shows that there is in fact a company
policy against hiring anyone over fifty years of age, but that even if
the plaintiff had been younger than this, he still would not have
been employed because of the defendant's policy against hiring
draft resisters. Under these facts, age clearly was "a factor" that
was considered, but it was not a factor that "made a difference."
The same result can be expressed in other terms: Age was not the
"but for" cause of the defendant's refusal to hire the plaintiff and,
therefore, was not a "determinative factor" in that refusal.
Altering this same hypothetical somewhat, suppose that plain-
tiff is over fifty years old and has only two years of college educa-
tion, but no criminal record. The same hypothetical defendant now
testifies that had the plaintiff been under fifty years of age with
two years of college he would have been hired. The factfinder thus
concludes that the plaintiff's age "made a difference." Once again,
the same conclusion can be expressed by stating that age was a
"but for" or "determining factor" in the defendant's decision.
Thus, variations of this hypothetical demonstrate that in any situ-
ation in which an impermissible discriminatory factor is "a moti-
vating factor" or "a substantial factor," it would be a "but for"
factor as well.223
221. The cause-in-fact determination, like that of proximate cause, is often a question
for the factfinder and calls for a common sense inquiry into physical causation. W. PROSSER,
supra note 81, § 41, at 237.
222. 29 U.S.C. §§ 622-634 (1976 & Supp. I1 1979).
223. Two tests have emerged in tort law. One is the "but for" test, in which the
factfinder asks whether the plaintiff would have been injured if the defendant had not acted
wrongfully. If the answer is "yes," then the "but for" cause in fact is not present; if the
answer is "no," then it is present. In some civil rights actions, the Supreme Court has used a
"but for" test to determine the causal relationship between plaintiff's damages and defen-
dant's conduct. E.g., Carey v. Phiphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978). The other test, which arose in
large measure because of the difficulties with the "but for" test, is the "substantial factor"
test. This test was used recently by the Supreme Court in Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd.
of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), in which the question was whether plaintiff's con-
duct, which was protected under the first amendment, played a "substantial part" in defen-
dant's decision not to renew plaintiff's contract. Accord, Givhan v. Western Line Consol.
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The "but for" rule of causation makes a distinction between
"a factor" and "a factor that makes a difference." In the first hypo-
thetical, age clearly was a factor that was considered, but it was
not a factor that made a critical difference in the defendant's con-
duct. If relief were granted every time age was considered, the ef-
fect might go well beyond the remedial intent of the Act, since re-
lief arguably would be awarded to claimants who never had an
opportunity for the job at any age. While such a broad construc-
tion would provide a strong deterrent against age discrimination, it
probably would exceed the prohibition that Congress envisioned.
In the second hypothetical, however, which illustrates the use of
the "but for" test, a plaintiff in a discrimination case would be en-
titled to recover only if the defendant considered an impermissible
criterion in its decisionmaking, and that consideration made a
difference in denying the plaintiff the opportunity that the law
sought to provide. Consistent application of this "but for" rule,
therefore, would facilitate the development of a workable rule on
burdens of proof allocation.224
The discrimination cases have emphasized that invidious dis-
crimination can-and usually does-stem from "archaic general-
School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1979). See generally Thode, The Indefensible Use of the
Hypothetical Case to Determine Cause in Fact, 46 Tax. L. R.v. 423 (1968). The Court in
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976), appears to accept the "but
for" test in discrimination disparate treatment cases. In explaining the "pretext" concept,
the Court noted that
[T]he use of the term "pretext" . does not mean, of course, that the Title VII
plaintiff must show that he would have in any event been rejected or discharged solely
on the basis of his race, without regard to the alleged deficiencies .... [N]o more is
required to be shown than that race was a "but for" cause.
Id. at 282 n.10. The citation in McDonald to Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
425 (1975), suggests that this "but for" test may be applicable to disparate impact cases as
well.
224. Some judges have argued that an important analytical distinction should be
drawn between a determination of causation based on a "pretext" and a determination
based upon the "but for" test. In NLRB v. Charles Batchelder Co., 646 F.2d 33 (2d Cir.
1981), for example, Judge Newman stated in his concurring opinion that
[s]imply stated, "pretext" analysis asks, "What happened?" "But for" analysis asks
"What would have happened?" When we say an asserted ground is a pretext, we mean
that we do not believe the employer when he says that he relied upon that ground in
taking the challenged action. When we say an employer has not sustained his burden
under the "but for" test, we mean that he has not proven that he would have acted the
same way if only the valid ground had existed. Of course, "but for" analysis asks the
hypothetical question as to what would have happened in order to reach a conclusion
as to the legal significance of what did happen, but the fact that both approaches an-
swer the same ultimate legal question should not obscure the different factual inquiries
each pursues.
Id. at 42 (footnote omitted).
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izations" about members of a protected class and their place in
society.2 25 This type of discrimination may not be a product of an
invidious animus toward blacks or women, for example, but it may
be a genuine-though misplaced-solicitude. Thus, the search for
a discriminatory intent should not halt simply upon a demon-
strated absence of manifest discrimination. The requirement of
discriminatory intent, if it is to be meaningful, must incorporate
something less than "intent to harm" members of protected clas-
ses. Although it is reasonable under this analysis to require that
plaintiffs demonstrate the causal relationship under the "but for"
test, it goes too far to suggest that plaintiffs must show that the
defendant's conduct would not have had a discriminatory applica-
tion but for the defendant's desire to achieve a harmful result.
C. Burdens of Pleading, Production of Evidence and
Persuasion
1. Plaintiff Should Have the Burden of Pleading a
Discrimination Claim
Since the federal courts have the ultimate responsibility for
enforcing federal laws that prohibit discrimination, the manner
and details of pleading in discrimination cases are governed by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8 of the federal rules sets
forth the standard for all pleadings. Therefore, under the frame-
work proposed by this Article, the plaintiff would have the burden
of pleading a discrimination claim under rule 8(a). According to
rule 8(a), a complaint must provide (1) a jurisdictional statement,
(2) a statement of the claim, and (3) a demand for judgment. Rule
8(a) thus establishes the pleading burden for plaintiffs in discrimi-
nation cases, and failure to comply with the rule will result in the
dismissal of the complaint unless the defect can be cured by an
amendment. This penalty has been imposed most often in discrim-
ination cases when the jurisdictional grounds have been
defective.22
2. Defendant Should Have the Burden of Pleading All
Statutory Exceptions and Judicially Created Defenses
Specific statutory defenses in discrimination statutes have
225. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 387-96 (1978) (Marshall,
J., concurring in part).
226. See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc., v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977); Johnson v. Rail-
way Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
1981] 1257
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
been characterized as affirmative defenses22 7 that are governed by
the pleading requirements in rule 8(c) of the federal rules. The ra-
tionale behind this characterization rests on the policy considera-
tion that the burdens of pleading and proving an exception should
be placed upon the defendant when dealing with humanitarian re-
medial statutes that serve important public purposes. 2 8
There is little or no discussion in the cases of who has the
burden of pleading the judicially created defenses of business ne-
cessity and a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.22 Since it is
now well recognized that proof on either of these defenses can de-
feat plaintiffs' claims,23 0 either the courts or the legislatures should
formulate a rule that, operating in conformity with the federal
rules, would impose upon one of the parties the burden of notify-
ing the court that either of these defenses is an element that must
be considered. Case law indicates that the burden of pleading on
these defenses should be placed upon the defendant. In Griggs v.
Duke Power Co.,231 for example, the Supreme Court was con-
fronted with a business necessity defense. The Court stated that
"Congress has placed on the [defendant] the burden of showing
that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to
the employment in question. '232 "The touchstone is business ne-
cessity. '23 3 The Court did not specify which of the "burdens" it
was speaking about, but it seems clear-and some lower courts
have so held-that it was referring to the burden of persuasion.
2'3
227. County of Washington v. Gunther, 101 S. Ct. 2242, 2247-49 (1981) (Equal Pay
Act and Title VII). See, e.g., Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir.
1969); Myers v. Gilman Paper Co., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 468, 470 (S.D. Ga. 1981). See
also Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974). Federal courts, however, com-
monly construct affirmative defenses without express statutory authority. See, e.g., Sorrells
v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932) (entrapment); Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469
(1895) (insanity); Ward v. Westland Plastics, Inc., 651 F.2d 1266, 1268 (5th Cir. 1980);
Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, No. CA-3-6982-G (N.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 1981).
228. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 1969).
229. Cf. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,716-17,
717 n.31 (1978) (suggesting that a cost defense must be asserted as an affirmative defense in
a Title VII sex discrimination case, even though cost is not a specific statutory defense);
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (suggesting that costs are
proper affirmative defenses in religious discrimination cases).
230. See generally Davis v. Califano, 613 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Mosby v. Webster
College, 563 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1977).
231. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
232. Id. at 432.
233. Id. at 431.
234. See cases cited notes 167-69 supra; Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, No. CA-3-
6982-G, slip op. at 7 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 1981). It is a fundamental principle that the burden
of proof on an affirmative defense rests upon the party who asserts it. The burden remains
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If Congress has in fact imposed upon the defendant the burden of
persuasion on business necessity, then this defense should be
treated as an affirmative defense under rule 8(c), and the defen-
dant should be required to plead it.
Similarly, the Court's recent decision in Gomez v. Toledo s5
supports a rule that would impose upon the defendant the burden
of pleading the defense of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.
Gomez was an action based upon section 1983 of the United States
Code, which provides a remedy to persons whose federal
rights-constitutional or statutory-have been infringed upon by a
defendant acting under color of state law.23 6 Section 1983 on its
face is silent on the question of immunity for states, municipali-
ties, or any other class of local or state defendants. Common-law
immunities, however-for example, those protecting legislators and
judges-were well established by the time the civil rights statutes
of the Reconstruction era were enacted. The Supreme Court has
held that Congress would have explicitly abolished these immuni-
ties in the enactment of section 1983 had it intended to eliminate
them.2 '7 As a result, the immunity defenses-both absolute and
qualified-are now well-established defenses in constitutional and
statutory claims arising under section 1983.38
In Gomez the Supreme Court addressed the pleading burden
of the qualified immunity defense and held that a section 1983 de-
fendant has the burden of pleading qualified immunity; corre-
spondingly, a section 1983 plaintiff need not allege bad faith in or-
der to state a claim for relief.239 Plaintiff in Gomez sued a police
superintendent for damages and alleged a violation of procedural
due process in his discharge from employment. Granting defen-
dant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief, the
district court concluded that the plaintiff was "required to plead as
part of his claim, that, in committing the act alleged, [defendant]
was motivated by bad faith. ' 240 The court of appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court resolved a conflict among the circuits and
reversed, holding that the qualified immunity doctrine is an affirm-
with that party until the termination of the action. Lilienthal's Tobacco v. United States, 97
U.S. 237 (1878).
235. 446 U.S. 635 (1980).
236. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
237. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951).
238. See generally Kattan, Knocking on Wood: Some Thoughts on the Immunities of
State Officials to Civil Rights Damage Actions, 30 VD. L. REv. 941 (1977).
239. 446 U.S. at 639-40.
240. Id. at 637.
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ative defense and thus is not relevant to the existence of a prima
facie case under section 1983.241 The Court emphasized two impor-
tant factors to support the proposition that a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory defense should be treated as an affirmative defense.
First, neither the language nor the legislative history of section
1983 indicates that a plaintiff must allege bad faith to state a claim
under the statute. Second, whether a qualified immunity exists in a
particular case "depends on facts peculiarly within the knowledge
and control of the defendant," which a plaintiff ordinarily cannot
be expected to know. 242 The Court observed that the second factor
is especially true of the subjective part of the immunity doctrine.24
One of the main purposes of the federal pleading rules is to
notify the factfinder of the issues in a case. Rules 8(b) and (d) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are intended to inform the
plaintiff and the court not only of those allegations in the com-
plaint that are admitted and thus will not be an issue at trial, but
also of those allegations that will be issues at trial. New matters
that are not alleged in the complaint are not controlled by rules
8(b) and (d); these allegations, which are in the nature of avoid-
ance and confession, are controlled by rule 8(c). 14 4 If the burden to
notify the court of the absence of any grounds that could defeat
plaintiff's entitlement to relief were placed upon the plaintiff, then
he would be required under the legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son doctrine to anticipate, plead, and controvert every possible
reason that the defendant could raise. If a defendant does not in-
tend for his response to the complaint to conform to the notice
theory of pleading envisioned by rules 8(b) and (c), the fairness
considerations upon which the Gomez Court relied dictate that
plaintiffs in discrimination cases should not have to anticipate any
number of potential defenses that defendants might assert under
the loosely defined doctrine of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason.
245
A more fundamental principle is also implicit in Gomez. As
Justice Rehnquist pointed out in his concurring opinion, the
241. Id. at 640.
242. Id. at 639-41.
243. Id. at 641. The subjective component of the immunity doctrines concerns the de-
fendant's "good faith" on the issue of the presence or absence of malicious intent. Baker v.
Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1121-22 (5th Cir. 1981).
244. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 33, § 1261.
245. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402
U.S. 313, 350 (1971) (purpose of rule 8(c) is to give the opposing party notice and a chance
to argue against the defense); FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1948).
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Court's decision in Gomez addressed only the burden of pleading
issue.2 46 Nevertheless, the Court's reasoning in this case just as
persuasively supports the proposition that the burden of producing
evidence, and-more importantly-the burden of persuasion,
should be allocated to the defendant in a section 1983 action.
3. A Prima Facie Case Should Establish A Rebuttable
Presumption of Discrimination
It is well settled that the plaintiff in a discrimination case has
the initial burden of producing evidence sufficient to establish the
elements of a prima facie violation. It is not clear, however,
whether a prima facie showing establishes an inference or a pre-
sumption of discrimination. As we have seen, the courts, including
the Supreme Court, have applied both designations to prima facie
cases.247 This indecision has served only to create confusion. To
dissipate the confusion, courts should adhere to the principle that
a prima facie case establishes a presumption of discrimination. Al-
though the Court recently followed this principle in Burdine, it
nevertheless continued to use the terms "presumption" and "infer-
ence" in a rather confusing fashion. 48
A number of courts and commentators have suggested that the
characterization of the prima facie case as a presumption should be
limited to the establishment of a rebuttable presumption of law,
which operates independently of any logical factual inference that
might also exist.249 The rationale for this presumption analysis has
a long history in discrimination cases, even under theories in which
intentional discrimination must be shown. Thus, in Keyes v.
School District No. 1,250 a school desegregation case brought under
the equal protection clause, the Supreme Court stated that
[a] finding of intentionally segregative school board actions in a meaningful
portion of a school system... creates a presumption that other segregated
schooling within the system is not adventitious. It establishes, in other words,
a prima facie case of unlawful segregative design on the part of school author-
ities, and shifts to those authorities the burden of proving that other segre-
gated schools within the system are not also the result of intentionally segre-
gative actions.251
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop-
246. 446 U.S. at 642.
247. See note 135 supra and accompanying text.
248. 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981). See Cleary, supra note 30, at 7.
249. See, e.g., Hecht & Pinzler, supra note 64, at 528.
250. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
251. Id. at 208 (emphasis added).
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ment Corp.252 the Supreme Court also adopted a rebuttable pre-
sumption analysis of a prima facie case in a section 1983 action.
The rationale for the proposition that a prima facie case cre-
ates a rebuttable presumption of discrimination is more fully ex-
plained in Supreme Court cases that deal with the statutory theo-
ries of disparate impact and disparate treatment. In International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,255 a disparate treat-
ment case brought under Title VII, the Court explained the nature
of the prima facie case as follows:
The holding in [Franks v. Bowman Transportation Company, 424 U.S.
747, 772-773 (1976)] that proof of a discriminatory pattern and practice cre-
ates a rebuttable presumption in favor of individual relief is consistent with
the manner in which presumptions are created generally. Presumptions shift-
ing the burden of proof are often created to reflect judicial evaluations of
probabilities and to conform with a party's superior access to the proof.
These factors were present in Franks .... [T]he employer was in the best
position to show why any individual employee was denied an employment
opportunity. Insofar as the reasons related to available vacancies or the em-
ployer's evaluation of the applicant's qualifications, the company's records
were the most relevant items of proof. If the refusal to hire was based on
other factors, the employer and its agents knew best what those factors were
and the extent to which they influenced the decisionmaking process.2"
Although the Court in Teamsters adopted this rationale after a vi-
olation had already been found, and the discussion was addressed
to the burden of proof in the relief phase of litigation, the Court's
reasoning is equally applicable to the determination of liability.
A prima facie case under the disparate impact theory is often
based at least in part upon statistical evidence. The use of statis-
tics is usually justified under both the probability theory 55 and
policy considerations.2 56 In approving the use of statistics in dis-
crimination cases, for example, the Court in Teamsters explained
that statistical evidence of racial or ethnic imbalance is probative
solely because the imbalance, if unexplained, is often a "telltale
sign of purposeful discrimination. 2 57 Similarly, in Hazelwood
School District v. United States258 the Court noted that "gross
statistical disparities . . . alone may in a proper case constitute
prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination.2 5 9
252. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
253. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
254. Id. at 359 n.45 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
255. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1976).
256. Id.
257. 431 U.S. at 339-40 n.20.
258. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
259. Id. at 307-08.
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The characterization of a prima facie case as a presumption
under the disparate impact theory can be justified by the social
policy of having legal consequences flow from the effects of specific
conduct, and it finds support in the legislative history. Thus, in the
amendments to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act,260 for example,
Congress specifically endorsed the disparate impact test as a guide
to the allocation of the burdens of proof in discrimination cases.
The Senate report on the amendments stated that
[t]he prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion
or national origin are unqualified. In the Committee's view, these characteris-
tics are totally unrelated to creditworthiness and cannot be considered by any
creditor. In determining the existence of discrimination on these grounds...
courts and agencies are free to look at the effects of a creditor's practices as
well as the creditor's motives or conduct in individual transactions. Thus ju-
dicial construction of anti-discrimination legislation in the employment field,
in cases such as Griggs v. Duke Power Company... and Albemarle Paper
Company v. Moody... are intended to serve as guides in the application of
the Act, especially with respect to the allocations of burdens of proof.21
Courts have focused on similar considerations of probability
and legislative and judicial policy in support of the characteriza-
tion of a prima facie case as a presumption under the disparate
treatment theory of discrimination. The Court in Teamsters, for
example, stressed the necessity of demonstrating a discriminatory
motive in disparate treatment cases. The Court stated that
"[u]ndoubtedly[,] disparate treatment was the most obvious evil
Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VH. ''2 62 Furthermore,
in Furnco, a more recent case than Teamsters, the Court offered a
probability-based rationale in support of a presumption
characterization:
A prima facie case under [the disparate treatment theory] raises an inference
of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unex-
plained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible
factors.... And we are willing to presume this largely because we know
from our experience that more often than not people do not act in a totally
arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a business
setting. Thus, when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have
been eliminated as possible reasons for the [defendant's] actions, it is more
likely than not the [defendant], who we generally assume acts only with some
reason, based his decision on an impermissible consideration such as race.
2 6
3
260. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1976).
261. S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1975), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 403, 406 (citations omitted).
262. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).




Although the Court in Furnco characterized the prima facie case as
an "inference," the rationale it offered clearly is based on one of
the well-recognized justifications for creating a presumption.2 "
A major problem in properly characterizing a prima facie case
is that the terms "inference" and "presumption" have been used
interchangeably to describe too many phenomena and to perform
too many tasks. Another problem exists in determining how much
evidence is necessary to meet the burden that an inference or pre-
sumption imposes upon the party against whom it operates. Char-
acterizing a prima facie case as a rebuttable presumption would
help to clarify this "chaos" if the courts would recognize that a
presumption analysis could facilitate the disposition of discrimina-
tion cases in three possible situations.265
The first situation occurs when there is no dispute about the
basic facts, and no rebuttal evidence has been submitted to show
the nonexistence of the presumed fact of discrimination. Absent
judicial notice or an admission by the defendant, the credibility of
the plaintiff's evidence or testimony is a question for the
factfinder. Accordingly, the judge or jury, as factfinder, must find
the presumed fact to be true if it finds the basic facts to be true.
Indeed, the courts have held that a prima facie case requires such
a result.2ee Thus, in discrimination cases in which the plaintiff has
presented evidence sufficient to constitute a prima facie case that
supports one of the theories of discrimination, and the defendant
has neither attacked the evidentiary foundation nor offered any in-
dependent evidence of justification, the court must find that the
264. See notes 63-70 supra and accompanying text.
265. See Hecht & Pinzler, supra note 64. The Supreme Court has held that allocating
the burden of proof in civil cases does not raise constitutional questions. See Lavine v.
Milne, 424 U.S. 577 (1976). Moreover, there is no constitutional doctrine that restricts the
burden-shifting effect of presumptions in civil cases to a shift in the burden of producing
evidence. There is, however, some inconsistency between two early Supreme Court cases
about whether there is a constitutional limitation on the use of presumptions in civil cases.
In Mobile, Jackson & K. C. R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910), the Court upheld a
Mississippi statute which provided that proof of an injury resulting from the running of
trains was prima facie evidence of the railroad's negligence. In Western & Atl. R.R. v. Hen-
demon, 279 U.S. 639 (1929), on the other hand, in which petitioners challenged a Georgia
statute that imposed liability upon a railroad for damage caused by its trains unless the
railroad could prove that its agents had exercised due care, the Court held that the statute
violated due process because it had no rational basis. One court noted, however, that the
two cases are readily distinguishable on their facts, and that due process analysis has funda-
mentally changed since the Court rendered these two decisions in the early 1900s. See 56
F.R.D. 183, 208-09 (1972) (discussion of the Advisory Committee's deliberations on the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence).
266. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1094 (1981).
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plaintiff has established a right to relief.2 7
The second situation occurs in a case in which the basic facts
are in dispute, and the defendant fails to introduce evidence to
show the nonexistence of the presumed fact. The factfinder's func-
tion under these circumstances is to make a finding of the basic
facts. If the factfinder concludes that the basic facts are true, he
must then find that the presumed fact exists. If, on the other hand,
the factfinder determines that the basic facts are not true, then it
cannot make a finding of the presumed fact.""8 Thus, in a discrimi-
nation case in which the plaintiff relies upon the disparate treat-
ment theory, for example, and there is a factual dispute about
whether the plaintiff applied for the job, whether he was qualified,
or whether the defendant was seeking applicants with the plain-
tiff's qualifications, the factfinder must rule for the plaintiff if it
finds that the basic elements of a prima facie case exist. If one of
the elements of a prima facie case is not established, however, then
the factfinder must rule for the defendant.26
The last situation comprises those cases in which the basic
facts that give rise to the presumed fact are established, but the
defendant introduces evidence to prove the nonexistence of the
presumed fact. The overwhelming majority of discrimination cases
falls into this third category, and it is in these cases that the allo-
cation of the burdens of proof is most confusing. The adoption of a
rule that would treat both statutory exceptions and judicially cre-
ated defenses as affirmative defenses, and which would hold that a
prima facie case creates a presumption rather than an inference,
would help resolve the conflict that occurs in this category of cases
when evidence is introduced to rebut the presumed fact.270 Even
under this rule, however, there would remain the question of the
operational effect of the presumption and the quantum of evidence
that a defendant must produce to rebut it.
267. Thus, when the defendant offers no justification to rebut a prima facie case, the
plaintiff should prevail. See Taylor v. Philips Indus., 593 F.2d 783, 786 (7th Cir. 1979). One
court has held that a prima facie case in discrimination litigation is established by the
amount of evidence necessary to convince the factfinder that there has been disparate treat-
ment. See Henry v. Ford Motor Co., 553 F.2d 46, 48 (8th Cir. 1977). The proposal suggested
by this Article specifically rejects a res ipsa loquitur approach to a prima facie case in dis-
crimination cases.
268. See Hecht & Pinzler, supra note 64, at 548.
269. See, e.g., Moore v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1979) (per
curiam); Sime v. Trustees of Cal. State Univ. & Colleges, 526 F.2d 1112 (9th Cir. 1975).
270. See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 1980 NLRB Dec. 1 17,356 (Aug. 27,
1980); notes 330-34 infra and accompanying text.
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4. The Burden of Producing Evidence and the Burden of
Persuasion
Perhaps the most critical question in allocating the burdens of
proof in discrimination cases is how to allocate the burden of pro-
ducing evidence and the burden of persuasion for each element of
the case. The resolution of this question depends in substantial
part on the outcome of two other related issues: The allocation of
the basic elements of a case between the plaintiff and the defen-
dant and the designation of the prima facie case as an inference or
a presumption. The first issue has been considered under the pro-
posed rule that statutory exceptions and judicially created de-
fenses should be treated as airmative defenses, which in turn
would impose upon a defendant all three burdens-pleading, pro-
duction of evidence, and persuasion. This proposed rule presents
yet another question, namely, whether a rule that imposes the bur-
dens of producing evidence and persuasion upon the defendant is
consistent with rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 301
provides that a presumption shifts the burden of production, but
that it does not shift the burden of persuasion.
Few courts that have characterized the plaintiff's prima facie
case as a presumption-either in the constitutional or statutory
cases-have discussed the applicability of rule 301.271 The Su-
preme Court in Burdine omitted any discussion of the rule. In-
deed, the only case to date that discusses the applicability of rule
301 in discrimination cases is United States v. City of ChicagoY
27
which dealt with a claim of disparate impact discrimination. De-
fendants argued that the Griggs rule, which imposed upon the de-
fendants the burden of persuasion on the business necessity de-
fense, had been altered by the subsequent enactment of rule 301.
Therefore, the defendants maintained that they could only be
charged with the burden of going forward with the evidence. The
court rejected this argument on the ground that the Griggs rule
was adopted pursuant to an "act of Congress" and was thus
271. Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that
[i]n all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress
or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the
burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not
shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which
remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.
The Federal Rules of Evidence were signed into law in 1975, as the Act of January 2, 1975,
Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (codified at 28 U.S.C., FED. R. Evm. 301).
272. 411 F. Supp. 218, 231-33 (N.D. IML 1976), affl'd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977).
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outside the mandate of rule 301. The reasoning in City of Chicago
is consistent with other court decisions that impose the burden of
proof upon the party who claims the protection of a statutory
exception.73
A more important question, however, is whether the City of
Chicago rationale supports a rule that would impose upon the de-
fendant the burden of persuasion on the judicially created defense
of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. For a number of reasons,
this question should be answered in the affirmative. First, courts
have recognized that the disparate impact and disparate treatment
theories are alternative approaches to determinations of discrimi-
nation.274 Therefore, it makes little sense to create a presumption/
inference dichotomy between these two modes of analysis, which
the courts seem to have done. The same policy, probability, and
fairness considerations apply to a prima facie case under both the-
ories.27 Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that dispa-
rate treatment discrimination is "the most obvious evil Congress
had in mind" when it enacted discrimination legislation.27 6 Thus, it
can be argued that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason de-
fense in disparate treatment cases is as much an "act of Congress"
as was the judicially developed business necessity defense in the
disparate impact case of City of Chicago. Consequently, the former
defense should also be outside the mandate of rule 301.
A second reason why the burden of persuasion on the defenses
of business necessity and a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
should be imposed upon the defendant is that there is a functional
problem with rule 301. Neither rule 301 nor any of the other fed-
eral rules of evidence defines, lists, or illustrates the function of
presumptions. Rather, the rule simply assumes the existence of
presumptions. In addition, the rule does not distinguish between
presumptions created for procedural, probability, or policy reasons;
it simply treats them all alike.2 7 Because of this ambiguity, rule
301 has been the subject of considerable debate among courts and
273. See also Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 669 (1979). The Court in
Wilson held that 25 U.S.C. § 194, a 145 year old statute that created a presumption of title
in favor of the Indians, shifted both the burden of producing evidence and the burden of
persuasion to adverse claimants once the Indian plaintiffs made out a prima facie case of
prior title.
274. See, e.g., Wright v. National Archives & Records Serv., 609 F.2d 702, 710-11 (4th
Cir. 1979); note 100 supra.
275. See notes 249-64 supra.
276. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 334 n.15 (1977).
277. See Hecht and Pinzler, supra note 64, at 554-55.
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commentators over which theory of presumptions should be read
into the rule.2 8
Most of the debate has centered around two theories, one
identified with James Bradley Thayer-the so-called Thayerian
theory279-and the other with Professor Morgan-the so-called
Morgan theory. °8 0 Thayer's theory generally is described as the
"bursting bubble" theory,28 1 although some commentators have
questioned whether this is an apt term for the doctrine.282 Under
the Thayerian theory, the sole effect of a presumption is to shift
the burden to the opponent to produce evidence contrary to the
presumed fact. If the opponent produces evidence of this nature,
the proponent's bubble-which has grown in reliance upon the
presumption-bursts; the presumption is dispelled; and the
factfinder is required to disregard whatever role the presumption
may have had in the trial.28
The Morgan theory, on the other hand, posits that a presump-
tion shifts both the burden of production and the burden of per-
suasion. Under Morgan's approach, jury instructions, for example,
would simply be addressed to the burden of persuasion on the exis-
tence of the presumed fact. Thus, in an age discrimination case the
jury would be told that if the plaintiff established a prima facie
case, a presumption would arise that the defendant considered the
impermissible criterion of age in its decisionmaking. The jury then
would be instructed that the defendant had the burden of persua-
278. See Ladd, Presumptions in Civil Actions, 1977 ARiz. ST. L.J. 275; Louisell, Con-
struing Rule 301: Instructing the Jury on Presumptions in Civil Actions and Proceedings,
63 VA. L. REV. 281 (1977). See also Mendez, supra note 4, at 1151-61; text accompanying
notes 275-89.
279. J. THAYER, supra note 11, at 313-52. See also Hecht and Pinzler, supra note 64;
Laughlin, supra note 64.
280. E. Morgan, Foreword, in MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 56-57 (1942); Morgan, supra
note 64; Morgan, Observations, supra note 64.
281. See Memorandum of Professor Edward W. Cleary (October 31, 1974), reproduced
in 1 J. WEINSTEIN, WEmsTmN's EVIDENCE, at 301-10 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Memorandum].
282. Cleary, supra note 30, at 17-18.
A strict "bursting bubble" theory has two relevant aspects. If the opponent introduces
no evidence to contradict the presumed fact, the proponent is entitled to a directed verdict.
If the proponent is relying solely upon the presumption in making his case and the oppo-
nent introduces evidence to contradict the presumed fact, then the presumption disappears,
and the judge will direct a verdict in favor of the opponent. Usually, however, the basic facts
underlying the presumption will yield a natural inference that will carry the case to the jury.
Thus, a case in which there would be a directed verdict against a proponent of a "pricked
bubble" would be rare. See Memorandum, supra note 281, at 301-10 to 301-12.
283. See Hecht & Pinzler, supra note 64, at 531-33.
1268 [Vol. 34:1205
BURDENS OF PROOF
sion on the nonexistence of its reliance upon the impermissible
criterion.284
Although there is a long history behind the codification of rule
301 in the federal system,28 5 a consensus has yet to emerge among
either commentators or the federal judiciary on how to interpret
this rule. Courts have relied primarily upon the treatment of the
rule in Weinstein's Evidence8 and Moore's Federal Practice.2 8
Judge Weinstein assumes that rule 301 adopted the Thayerian the-
ory, noting that the language of the rule makes it clear that only
the burden of producing evidence is shifted.8 8 Weinstein's inter-
pretation holds to the view that, in order to dispel the effects of a
presumption, the party against whom the presumption operates
must present evidence sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to con-
clude that the contrary of the presumed fact is true. Under this
analysis, the term "presumption" would never be mentioned to a
jury, 2 9 although the court may point out that an inference is al-
lowed to be drawn from the basic facts. Unless the court decides as
a matter of law that the basic facts or the presumed fact either is
or is not established, the question must go to the jury
2 90
The treatment of rule 301 presumptions in Moore's Federal
Practice also assumes that the rule embodies Professor Thayer's
theory.2 91 Although Moore's treatment of this point is more im-
plicit than explicit, there are some indications in the treatise which
suggest that the basic facts-as distinguished from the presumed
facts-may sometimes have an intrinsic probative value that is suf-
284. C. MCCORMCK, supra note 3, § 345; Morgan, supra note 63, at 281.
The cases suggest that the courts apply the Morgan view of presumptions to statutory
defenses and the judicially developed doctrine of business necessity. See, e.g., Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). The Thayer view, on the other hand, is applied to the
judicially created defense of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981). No rationale is suggested in the cases
for this disparity in treatment.
285. See, e.g., Proposed Rules of Evidence of the U.S. District Courts and Magistrates
(West 1969), 46 F.R.D. 161, 212-14 (1969), 51 F.R.D. 315, 336 (1971), 56 F.R.D. 183, 208
(1973). References to the legislative history can be found in 1 J. WEINSTEIN, WEINSTEIN'S
EvIENCE 301-1 to 301-13 (1980).
286. Id. at 300-1 to 301-36.
287. 10 J. MooRE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 301.01-.31 (2d ed. 1979).
288. "[T]he pure Thayer rule was adopted." 1 J. WINsTEM, supra note 285, at 301-12.
289. Id. 301[02], at 301-28.
290. Id. at 301-30.
291. 10 J. MooRE, supra note 287, §§ 301.01-.31. The authors state that "Congress
adopted an unsullied Thayer theory." Id. § 301.0111], at 1I-6.
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ficient to carry the case to the jury.2 92 Thus, in situations in which
the party against whom the presumption operates produces no evi-
dence, the authors embrace the result described in the federal con-
ference report: "[T]he court will instruct the [factfinder] that if it
finds the basic facts, it may presume the existence of the presumed
fact." 293
292. Id. §§ 301.01-.31. The authors' view of Thayer's theory is most fully stated in id.
§§ 301.04[2], at HI-19.
293. H.R. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE & AD.
NEWS 7098, 7099. Two other major works also offer a treatment of this subject- 21 C.
WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1977); 1 D. LoumSL & C. MuEL-
LER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE (1977). Wright and Graham's treatment of rule 301 does not assume
that the rule adopts the Thayerian theory. C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra, §§ 5121-5129.
Their discussion seems to proceed on the assumption that Congress sought a theory inter-
mediate between the Morgan and Thayer theories. See id. § 5121, at 546-47; § 5122, at 557;
§ 5126, at 606, 614. These authors seem to place considerable reliance upon the Congres-
sional Conference Report, which discusses the version of rule 301 that ultimately was en-
acted. The Conference Report states that
[t]he House bill provides that a presumption in civil actions and proceedings shifts to
the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to
meet or rebut it. Even though evidence contradicting the presumption is offered, a
presumption is considered sufficient evidence of the presumed fact to be considered by
the jury. The Senate amendment provides that a presumption shifts to the party
against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to meet or rebut
the presumption, but it does not shift to that party the burden of persuasion on the
existence of the presumed fact.
Under the Senate amendment, a presumption is sufficient to get a party past an
adverse party's motion to dismiss made at the end of his case-in-chief. If the adverse
party offers no evidence contradicting the presumed fact, the court will instruct the
jury that if it finds the basic facts, it may presume the existence of the presumed fact.
If the adverse party does offer evidence contradicting the presumed fact, the court can-
not instruct the jury that it may presume the existence of the presumed fact from
proof of the basic facts. The court may, however, instruct the jury that it may infer the
existence of the presumed fact from proof of the basic facts.
H.R. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
7098, 7099.
Under yet another analysis, Louisell and Mueller treat rule 301 in two ways. On the one
hand, they recognize that the rule can be read to adopt the Thayerian view. 1 D. LouisELL &
C. MuSxuER, supra, § 70, at 566; id. § 69, at 555. On the other hand, they seek to find a
"variant mode" under the rule by giving it what they consider to be a broader reading. Id. §
70, at 566, 574. Under this alternative interpretation, Louisell and Mueller reach a result
similar to the one advocated by Wright and Graham, but they do so through a different
analysis. Id. at 581. Ultimately, however, it appears that these authors are of the opinion
that a narrower reading of rule 301 yields an unsatisfactory result because it does not give
sufficient recognition to the procedural, probability, or policy reasons underlying the differ-
ent presumptions. They suggest, for example, that if the presumption is based upon policy
grounds, the factfnder, if it finds the basic facts to be true, should also find the presumed
fact to be true, unless upon all the evidence it finds that the nonexistence of the presumed
fact is at least as probable as its existence. If, however, the presumption is founded on
procedural or probability grounds, then these authors would allow the presumption to be
taken merely as strong evidence of the presumed fact. Id. at 574-75, 579.
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The adoption of a rule in discrimination cases that treats all
defenses as affirmative defenses would avoid the problem that is
highlighted in the debate over rule 301. This proposal is not, how-
ever, aimed at escaping the application of rule 301; rather, it is
consistent with the rule, since the latter is not relevant when the
burden of persuasion on an element of a case is assigned to a party
by substantive law considerations.
Imposing the burden of persuasion upon defendants in dis-
crimination cases is consistent with the theory that underlies the
prima facie case doctrine which the Supreme Court has adopted in
discrimination cases. The prima facie doctrine in both constitu-
tional and statutory cases requires, in effect, that if a plaintiff has
met the threshold requirement of proof, then-absent explanation
or justification-this showing justifies the imposition of liability
upon the defendant.2 9 4 Under this construction of the prima facie
case, it is only reasonable and fair to impose upon a defendant the
obligation-that is, the burden of persuasion-to demonstrate that
his conduct was motivated by lawful reasons. 95
5. Satisfying the Burden of Persuasion: A Uniform
Preponderance of the Evidence Standard
The plaintiff in a discrimination case has the civil litigant's
traditional burden of satisfying the factfinder that the defendant
violated at least one of the plaintiff's legally protected rights. Sat-
isfaction of this burden is measured by the "preponderance of the
evidence" standard, which means that after the close of the evi-
dence, the trier of fact must be persuaded that it is more likely
than not that the decisionmaker impermissibly relied upon one of
the prohibited criteria in making his allegedly unlawful determina-
tions.2 98 The defendant in a discrimination case, whether relying
upon a statutory defense or the judicially created defense of busi-
ness necessity, must also satisfy his burden of proof by meeting the
preponderance of the evidence standard.97 The question to be re-
294. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981)
(statutory case); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (constitutional case);
Kirby v. Colony Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 696, 703-04, 703 n.5 (8th Cir. 1980) (business neces-
sity); Marshall v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 576 F.2d 588, 591 (5th Cir. 1978) (employer has
burden of persuasion on bona fide occupational qualification).
295. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
296. See F. JAMEs & G. HAZARD, supra note 3, § 7.6.
297. Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (Congress imposed upon defen-




solved in this area is which standard should apply when a defen-
dant asserts the defense of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.
The "articulation" standard, which a majority of the Court
adopted in McDonnell Douglas,9 can be interpreted either as a
rule on the burden that shifts to a defendant after the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case, or as a test for the quantum of proof
that a defendant must present. Alternatively, the standard can be
interpreted as doing both of these things. To the extent that Bur-
dine is read to reduce the articulation standard solely to a burden-
shifting rule-which it seems to do2 99 -the proposals already set
forth under the pleading and burden of persuasion subsections in
this part of the Article are a more appropriate approach. If, how-
ever, the "articulation" rule, as explained in Burdine, establishes a
standard for determining whether the burden of persuasion has
been satisfied, then it introduces a measure that has never before
been used in the lexicon of burdens of proof. 00 Under this inter-
pretation, the "articulation" rule sets forth several variants of a
standard that is far less demanding than the preponderance of the
evidence standard. First, Burdine may suggest the reintroduction
of the so-called scintilla of evidence rule, which the federal courts
generally do not favor.301 Second, the standard could suggest that a
plaintiff who has made out a prima facie case still may not be enti-
tled to prevail even though the defendant's evidence is non-
credible.0 2 Last, if Burdine is construed to incorporate the
Thayerian theory of presumptions, which some commentators be-
Ieve adopts rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, then the
Court has failed completely to deal with the functional problem
that this evidentiary rule raises.
The proposal which is suggested by this Article-that the pre-
298. See notes 126-29 supra and accompanying text.
299. See note 158 supra and accompanying text (Burdine analysis that defendant does
not have the burden of persuasion).
300. See Morse, supra note 58.
301. The federal courts have rejected the scintilla rule repeatedly. Pennsylvania R.R.
Co. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333, 343 (1933); Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 623 F.2d 395, 398
(5th Cir. 1980) (quoting Mann v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 300 F.2d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 1962));
Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc). The potential reach of read-
ing Burdine and Sweeney to adopt the scintilla of evidence rule can be found in Lombard v.
School Dist., 463 F. Supp. 566, 571 (W.D. Pa. 1978), in which the court held that defen-
dant's statement to the effect that a man was selected over a woman because the man had
more friends in high places satisfied the "articulation" standard.
302. It appears, however, that the federal courts require both plaintiffs and defendants
to present credible evidence. See, e.g., Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 372
(4th Cir. 1980); Smithers v. Bailor, 629 F.2d 892, 898 (3d Cir. 1980).
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ponderance standard should control not only the plaintiff's ulti-
mate burden but also the defendant's burden on affirmative de-
fenses, rejects all possible interpretations of the McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine "articulation" standard. The adoption of this
proposed rule would mean, simply, that for either party to prevail,
his evidence in support of the elements on which he has the bur-
den of persuasion must outweigh the evidence of his opponent.
6. The Pretext Stage of Proof Should be Eliminated
The courts have placed great emphasis on the so-called pre-
text stage,308 which the Supreme Court devised in McDonnell
Douglas, Burdine, and Moody. What a plaintiff does or does not
do in the pretext stage is often critical to the outcome of the case.
The Court apparently formulated the pretext stage in an attempt
to insure that plaintiffs have a "full and fair opportunity"3  to
make the showing of causation that is necessary to establish liabil-
ity. Thus, even if the defendant effectively rebuts the plaintiff's
prima facie case through a showing of a statutory exception, busi-
ness necessity, or a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the plain-
tiff must be afforded an opportunity to show that the defendant's
asserted justification was in fact merely a pretext for unlawful
discrimination.30
5
303. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981); Furnco
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). Compare Robbins v. White-Wilson Medical
Clinic, Inc., 642 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1981) (pretext shown) with Panlilio v. Dallas Ind. School
Dist., 643 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1981) (pretext not shown).
304. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1096 (1981); Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973). The "full and fair opportunity"
theory also has doctrinal foundations in the federal habeas corpus cases. See Stone v. Pow-
ell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). Justice Powell is the author of both the Stone and Burdine opin-
ions. The Court in Stone, however, failed to provide guidelines for its "opportunity" test. A
number of commentators have expressed serious concern over the potential effect that the
opportunity test may have on state criminal defendants' access to the federal courts for
review of alleged violations of their federal constitutional rights. See, e.g., Greene, Stone v.
Powell: The Hermeneutics of the Burger Court, 10 CReGHTON L. Rxv. 655 (1977);
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 H.Rv. L. Rav. 1105 (1977); Comment, The "Opportu-
nity" Test of Stone v. Powell: Toward a Redefinition of Federal Habeas Corpus, 23 VmL. L.
Rev. 1095 (1977-1978). See generally Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas
Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977). The Court in Burdine likewise did not
provide guidelines for the "full and fair opportunity" test. The Court's failure to provide
these guidelines is significant because the test may provide a method for limiting federal
review of discrimination claims. See Morrison, Rights Without Remedies: The Burger Court
Takes the Federal Courts Out of the Business of Protecting Federal Rights, 30 RUTGMSW L.
Rav. 841, 851-52 (1977).
305. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973).
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The establishment of this new stage of litigation in discrimina-
tion cases is completely unnecessary. The defendant should be re-
quired to establish a statutory exception, business necessity, or a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Any contention that the as-
serted defense was not pretextual or manufactured is inherent in
the defendant's proof.308 Thus, if a defendant has the burdens to
plead, produce evidence, and persuade on affirmative de-
fenses-which this proposal suggests that he should-then obvi-
ously he should be made to convince the trier of fact that his rea-
sons were both legitimate and nondiscriminatory. If the term
"legitimate" is defined as "genuine, 3 07 then the defendant neces-
sarily must satisfy the factfnder that his reasons were genuine and
nondiscriminatory in order to prove a nonpretextual defense.3 08
Apparently, however, the Court is not using "legitimate" correctly
in the sense of "genuine," since if it were, the Court's new procedu-
ral arrangement would be rendered meaningless.309 Perhaps even
more important, this third step ultimately has the effect of placing
a burden upon the plaintiff that-as suggested above-should be
placed upon the defendant.
V. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
The proposed allocation of the burdens of proof in discrimina-
tion cases can be reduced to three basic statements. First, the
plaintiff has all three burdens on his prima facie case, and he must
demonstrate his right to relief in accordance with the preponder-
ance of evidence standard. Second, defendant has all three burdens
306. See Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 28-29
(1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
307. WEBsTER's THsD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIoNARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 948
(P. Gove ed. 1961).
308. See New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979) (when a
defendant demonstrates business necessity, a plaintiff fails to satisfy his ultimate burden of
proving discrimination).
309. The statement in Burdine that "defendant need not persuade the court that it
was actually motivated by the [articulated] reasons," 101 S. Ct. at 1094, strongly suggests
that the Court did use the term "legitimate" to mean "genuine." This statement implies
that even though the defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason must be "clear and
reasonably specific," id. at 1096, it need not be either the "real reason" or based upon credi-
ble evidence. Id. at 1095 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05
(1973)). But see NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964). In Burnup & Sims, Inc.
the Supreme Court held that an employer violated § 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976), when he discharged two employees who were engaged in
lawful activity, even though the employer did not have a wrongful motive. The Court stated
that the employer's good faith was irrelevant because the employer's conduct would or
might have a deterrent effect on other employees.
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on all defenses-both statutory and judicially created. Last, when
defendant asserts an affirmative defense and fails to meet any of
these burdens, plaintiff is entitled to relief under the preponder-
ance of the evidence rule-assuming, of course, that plaintiff has
met the prima facie case requirement. There are cogent precedents
and both procedural and substantive policy considerations that
support this proposed framework. For purposes of analysis, these
rationales can be grouped most conveniently into three categories.
The first category is based upon the principle of ejusdem generis:
Like rules should apply to cases of the same class. The second cat-
egory is concerned with the constructive functions that the bur-
dens of proof perform in the courtroom; they are directed toward a
fair ordering of the process of proving discrimination in situations
in which the intent element is or is not deemed to be critical. The
last category reflects a public policy judgment about the degree of
responsibility that should be placed upon defendants to promote
the national policy against discrimination.
A. Precedents: Mt. Healthy and Wright Line
The proposals suggested by this Article build upon precedents
for the allocation of the burdens of pleading, producing evidence,
and persuasion that have been developed in analogous areas of the
law. The decisions of the Supreme Court in Mt. Healthy City
School District Board of Education v. Doyle8 10 and Gomez v.
Toledo,"' taken together, clearly support the proposed framework.
In fact, it is difficult to harmonize the results in these two cases
with Burdine, especially when all three are considered in light of
the Court's holding in Washington v. Davis1 2 that statutory
prohibitions against discrimination require a "more probing judi-
cial review" than similar claims based upon the Constitution.1
Moreover, the Court's decision in Mt. Healthy has been the basis
for the National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) approach to dis-
crimination cases arising under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA),31 ' which the NLRB has adopted in an effort to harmonize
its decisions with those of the federal courts. The NLRA, in turn,
has been the basic statutory scheme-directly or deriva-
tively-upon which Congress has patterned most of the other stat-
310. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
311. 446 U.S. 635 (1980).
312. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
313. Id. at 247.
314. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976).
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utory prohibitions against discrimination.-15
The NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer
to discriminate against its employees in the exercise of their rights
under the Act. The Act does not state explicitly that an employer's
intent is controlling on, or even relevant to, the determination
whether an employer has engaged in discriminatory conduct. Thus,
section 8(a)(3) of the Act, for example, broadly proscribes any em-
ployment practice that encourages or discourages union activity. 16
Nevertheless, it is clear that Congress did not intend for either the
NLRB or the courts to give this provision its literal scope, since
any decision on the terms or conditions of employment, or on
union activities in general, necessarily would have the ef-
fect-however indirect-of encouraging or discouraging union ac-
tivity. 1 7 Instead, Congress chose to preserve the employer's legiti-
mate interest in an efficient and productive work force to the
extent that its discriminatory employment practices are not in-
tended to reward or penalize union activity.318
The NLRB and the courts have often differed on both the ap-
propriate test of causation and the 'allocation of the burdens of
proof in deciding discrimination cases under the NLRA.319 A major
part of the difficulty is attributable to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.,3 20 a case in which the
Court formulated two theories of discrimination that parallel in
substantial part the two theories which have been read into Title
VII. Great Dane Trailers dealt with an employer's alleged viola-
tion of sections 8(a)(1) and (a)(3) of the NLRA.32 1 The employer
refused to pay striking employees vacation benefits that had ac-
crued under a terminated collective bargaining agreement. At the
315. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 578 (1978); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 419 (1975); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 50 (1974).
316. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
317. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
318. See, e.g., NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
319. See, e.g., Coletti's Furniture, Inc. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 1292 (1st Cir. 1977); Du-
Ross, Toward Rationality in Discriminatory Discharge Cases: The Impact of Mt. Healthy
Board of Education v. Doyle Upon the NLRA, 66 GEo. L.J. 1109 (1978).
320. 388 U.S. 26 (1967); accord, NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 380
(1967); see Christensen & Svanoe, supra note 86, at 1312; DuRoss, supra note 319, at 1118;
Janofsky, New Concepts in Interference and Discrimination Under the NLRA The Legacy
of American Ship Building and Great Dane Trailers, 70 COLUM. L. Rav. 81 (1970); Oberer,
The Scienter Factor in Sections 8(a)(1) & (3) of the Labor Act: Of Balancing, Hostile Mo-
tives, Dogs, & Tails, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 491 (1967).
321. Ch. 120, § 8(a)(1), (a)(3), 61 Stat. 140-41 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C.
§ 158 (a)(1), (a)(3) (1976)).
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same time, the employer announced that it would pay these bene-
fits to striker replacements, returning strikers, and nonstrikers who
worked during the walkout. The NLRB and the court of appeals
agreed that discrimination between striking and nonstriking em-
ployees had been established. The court of appeals, however, ruled
that the Board-acting on behalf of the employees-would not be
entitled to relief unless it affirmatively proved that the employer
had acted under an unlawful motivation either to discourage union
membership or to interfere with the exercise of protected rights.
The employer had made no effort to show any legitimate business
purpose for its discriminatory action; the court of appeals, how-
ever, speculated that the motivation might have been to reduce ex-
penses, to encourage longer tenure among present employees, or to
discourage early leaves immediately before vacation periods. The
court denied enforcement of the Board's decision in favor of the
employees on the ground that these motives possibly were suffi-
cient to overcome the inference that an improper motive was re-
sponsible for the employer's conduct.
The Supreme Court reversed and held that discrimination
clearly had been shown in the section 8(a)(3) charge. According to
the Court, the employer's conduct was "inherently destructive,"
and the employer thus should have the burden of justifying or
characterizing its "actions as something different than they appear
on their face."32 Otherwise, the Court stated, "an unfair labor
practice charge is made out. 82 3 The Supreme Court went even fur-
ther, however, and said that even if the employer comes forward
with counterexplanations for his conduct, "the Board may never-
theless draw an inference of improper motive from the conduct it-
self and exercise its duty to strike the proper balance between the
asserted business justifications and the invasion of employee rights
... .,"M24 The Court then announced the following two principles:
(1) If it can be reasonably concluded that the employer's discrimi-
natory conduct was "inherently destructive" of important em-
ployee rights, no proof of antiunion motivation is needed, and the
Board can find an unfair labor practice even if the employer in-
troduces evidence that the conduct was motivated by business
considerations; and (2) if the adverse effect of the discriminatory
conduct on employee rights is "comparatively slight," and the em-
322. 388 U.S. at 33 (quoting NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228 (1963)).
323. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228 (1963)).
324. Id. at 33-34.
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ployer comes forward with evidence of legitimate and substantial
business justifications for his conduct, then the Board must prove
an antiunion motivation to sustain its charge. In either situation,
according to the Court, once the Board shows discriminatory con-
duct that could adversely affect the employee's rights, the burden
is on the employer to establish that he was motivated by legitimate
objectives, since proof of motivation is more accessible to him than
to the plaintiff."2 5
Thus, the Board normally must make an affirmative showing
that the employer's discriminatory conduct was motivated by an
antiunion purpose to prove a violation of section 8(a)(3). When an
employer's conduct is characterized as "inherently destructive,"
however, unlawful motivation is presumed to exist.32 e Therefore,
the characterization of discriminatory conduct as either "inher-
ently destructive" or having a "comparatively slight" adverse effect
is critical, since this characterization determines which party will
have the benefit of a presumption of lawful or unlawful motivation
once the showing of a "legitimate and substantial business justifi-
cation" has been made. "Inherently destructive" discriminatory
conduct bears "its own indicia of intent" and thus frees the Gen-
eral Counsel from the difficult task of proving unlawful motiva-
tion. 2 7 Even if the employer establishes a "legitimate and substan-
tial business justification" for "inherently destructive" conduct,
the presumption of unlawful motivation remains, which leaves to
the Board the delicate task of balancing conflicting legitimate in-
terests in accordance with the policy of the Act.82 8 Similarly, dis-
criminatory conduct that has only a "comparatively slight" adverse
effect on employee rights raises a presumption of unlawful motive.
If that presumption is rebutted by a showing of "legitimate and
substantial business justifications," however, the presumption of
unlawful motive disappears; the conduct in question becomes
prima facie lawful; and the burden shifts to the General Counsel to
prove affirmatively that the employer acted under an unlawful
motive.
32 9
Recently, the Board attempted to harmonize its differences
with the federal courts on the treatment of discrimination cases
325. Id. at 34.
326. Id. at 33 (citing American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 311 (1965);
NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 287 (1965)).
327. Id. at 33 (citing NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 231 (1963)).
328. Id. at 33-34.
329. Id. at 34.
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that arise under the NLRA. In Wright Liness" the Board adopted
not only the Mt. Healthy test for causation, but also the Court's
allocation of the burdens of proof in deciding discrimination cases
brought under the Act. Wright Line was a "mixed motive" case.
On the one hand, the employer had a potentially legitimate reason
to discharge an employee who breached a valid working rule; on
the other hand, the employer also harbored a strong antiunion ani-
mus. The issue before the NLRB was whether the employee had
been discharged because of his violation of a valid working rule or
because of the employer's antiunion animus. Applying the Mt.
Healthy rationale, the Board held that plaintiff General Counsel
initially must establish a prima facie showing which is sufficient to
support an inference that protected conduct was a motivating fac-
tor in the employer's decision. Once the General Counsel estab-
lishes a prima facie case, according to the NLRB, the burden shifts
to the employer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the same action would have taken place even in the absence of the
protected conduct.331 The Board, concerned that the application of
Mt. Healthy might be read as shifting to the employer the ulti-
mate burden of proving that his action did not constitute a viola-
tion, noted that
this shifting of burdens does not undermine the established concept that the
General Counsel must establish an unfair labor practice by a preponderance
of the evidence. The shifting burden merely requires the employer to make
out what is actually an affirmative defense... to overcome the prima facie
case of wrongful motive. Such a requirement does not shift the ultimate
burden. 8 2
The courts of appeals generally have accepted the Wright Line ap-
proach to resolving the differences between the Board and the
courts. 33 Thus, neither Mt. Healthy nor Wright Line purports to
330. 251 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 1980 NLRB Dec. 17,356 (Aug. 27, 1980).
331. Id., 1980 NLRB Dec. at 32,466. At least one court had suggested the Mt. Healthy
approach prior to its adoption by the Board. NLRB v. Eastern Smelting & Refining Corp.,
598 F.2d 666, 671 (1st Cir. 1979).
332. 251 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 1980 NLRB Dec. 1 17,356, at 32,472 n.11. In arbitration
proceedings under a collective bargaining agreement, the employer bears the burden of
proof on the defense of just cause. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKouri, How ARBrrRATiON WORKS
621 (3d ed. 1973). See also Blumrosen, supra note 115.
The Board's characterization of the employer's business justification as "an affirmative
defense" is supported by Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980). See 251 N.L.R.B. No. 150,
1980 NLRB Dec. 17,356, at 32,472 n.11.
333. See, e.g., NLRB v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 651 F.2d 442 (6th Cir. 1981); NLRB
v. Nevis Indus., Inc., 647 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Charles Batchelder Co., 646
F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1981); Statler Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 644 F.2d 902 (1st Cir. 1981).
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change the accepted rule that the plaintiff must bear the ultimate
burden of establishing his right to relief.33 4
Much of the confusion on the burdens of proof allocation
problem in discrimination cases parallels a similar development in
the NLRA cases prior to Wright Line. The Mt. Healthy decision
provided a rationale for the Board in Wright Line to adopt both a
rule of causation and a burdens of proof allocation that should re-
duce the confusion and conflict which has been prevalent in the
labor cases. Mt. Healthy, as interpreted by Wright Line, also pro-
vides a readily available rationale for the courts to do likewise in
discrimination cases.
B. Procedural Justifications
Intent is rarely susceptible of direct proof; rather, it must be
inferred from a totality of circumstances. The courts have recog-
nized that the line between discriminatory intent and discrimina-
tory impact is not as distinct as it appears to be at first glance.3 5
Indeed, the difficulties of proving intent have led some commenta-
tors to advise either alternatives for or outright abandonment of
the distinction between effects and intent in discrimination
cases.13 6 Justice Powell, in a lengthy and cogent concurring opinion
in a school desegregation case, recognized the intractable problem
of litigating the issue of intent when he pointed out that trial
courts often come to disparate conclusions on similar sets of
facts.3 37 He considered the evidentiary problem presented by the
intent requirement to be impossible for trial courts to resolve, par-
ticularly since the Supreme Court had failed to articulate clearly
the kind of proof that is necessary to establish this element. 8
334. The General Counsel of the NLRB recently issued a memorandum on his inter-
pretation of the Wright Line case, which stated that "[i]t is important to note that the
employer must show that the decision would have been the same in the absence of protected
activity. A showing that the employer could have come to the same conclusion will not be
sufficient to establish the affirmative defense." Office of the General Counsel, Mem. 80-58,
at 2 n.5 (Nov. 4, 1980) (emphasis in original).
335. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 254 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). See gen-
erally Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Powell, J., plurality
opinion).
336. See, e.g., Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Con-
cepts, 78 HARv. L. REv. 564 (1965); Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitu-
tional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CALiF. L. Rav. 275 (1972).
337. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 233 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
338. Id. at 232-33 (Powell, J., concurring). The Supreme Court's adoption of a broad




Even if it were possible for the courts to clarify the issue, Justice
Powell correctly noted that "wide and unpredictable differences of
opinion among judges would be inevitable when dealing with an
issue as slippery as 'intent' or 'purpose,' especially when related to
hundreds of decisions made by school authorities under varying
conditions.
33 9
The cases suggest that under a "prima facie-inference-articu-
late" analysis, judges are reluctant to intrude into the realm of
business, administrative, or other decisionmaking processes.3 °
Thus, courts deliberately have avoided rigorous scrutiny of the
motivations that prompt these decisions; at the same time, how-
ever, they have recognized that the decisionmaking process itself,
however, may in reality be a "ready mechanism" for masking a dis-
criminatory purpose.34 1
The difficulties and uncertainty surrounding an intent element
are functions of the inferential mode of proof, as well as of the
judicial reluctance to infer intent once faced with the issue. The
evidentiary burden imposed upon a plaintiff by the "prima facie-
inference-articulate" approach cannot be met if the evidence of de-
fendant's intent betrays no pattern or practice with recognized dis-
criminatory effects. When the discrimination is perpetrated by sys-
temic and subtle practices that are embedded in institutional and
organizational structures, the unlawful intent is carefully camou-
flaged by numerous purportedly objective variables. As one com-
339. Id. at 233 (Powell, J., concurring).
340. For decisions holding particular subjective evaluations generally beyond the com-
petence of individual judges, see Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1980) (professor's
research and scholarship); Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1980) (pro-
fessor's professional stature); Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1978) (teach-
ing ability), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984 (1979). See also Davis v. Califano, 613 F.2d 957, 967
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting); Friedman, supra note 4.
341. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 231 (5th Cir. 1974).
The Fifth Circuit has noted that once a defendant has offered an explanation or evi-
dence after plaintiff has established a prima facie case,
[T]he inquiry does not necessarily stop here. Courts must be extremely careful to de-
termine that the reasons given for [its defense] are not simply a ruse for disguising true
discrimination. Courts must ... carefully scrutinize the [defendant's] explanations for
its conduct once the aggrieved [plaintiff] has proved a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion .... [I]f the [defendant] in any way permits stereotypical culturally-based con-
cepts of the abilities of people to perform certain tasks because of their sex to creep
into its thinking, then Title VII will come to the employee's aid.
Pond v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 500 F.2d 161, 166 (5th Cir. 1974); accord, Davis v. Califano,
613 F.2d 957, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Rogers v. International Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340 (8th
Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 423 U.S. 809, reinstated with modifications on other
grounds, 526 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1975).
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mentator has noted, "[I]t is difficult enough to infer motive from
an ambiguous act; it is harder still to infer it from a failure to
act. 3
42
While in a general sense it is true that the judicial system re-
quires the plaintiff in a civil action to prove his claim by a prepon-
derance of the evidence because of the notion of fundamental fair-
ness-just as the prosecution must bear it in a criminal case-this
notion is by no means universally or rigidly applied. Decisions on
who should bear a particular burden of proof rest on the closely
interrelated considerations of policy, fairness, and probability.u
The adversary system has made adjustments, within reasonable
limits, for the practical necessities of litigation, as well as for the
principle that in some circumstances fairness and common sense
dictate that the burden of proof should be placed upon defendants.
Even in criminal cases, in which the prosecution's burden of proof
is the most onerous-proof beyond a reasonable doubt, reinforced
by the presumption of innocence-considerations of convenience
and common sense cause the burden on some issues to be placed
upon defendants. Thus, with the defenses of insanity, excuse or
mitigation, self-defense, and alibi, a defendant may have the bur-
den of proof.
44
342. Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part III: The Gary Litigation,
59 Nw. U.L. REv. 121, 139 (1964).
Professor Cleary has offered a perceptive analysis of how the law decides which ele-
ments of a case a plaintiff or a defendant must prove to prevail. Cleary, supra note 30. He
argues that this decision rests on the closely interrelated considerations of policy, fairness,
and probability. Professor Cleary thus contends that the concept of the prima facie case of a
legal wrong is a construct based on experience-which is of two kinds. First, there is the
experience with the world of everyday events that give rise to disputes over claims of rights.
This experience is the origin of society's expectations about people's capacities, limitations,
and propensities; therefore, it is also the origin of the substantive rules that we need society
to make for itself. Second, there is the experience with the legal controversy it-
self-particularly the litigation. From this legal experience, people learn what points are
likely to be difficult to resolve in disputes of various kinds, as well as the points upon which
the outcome is likely to depend.
343. See note 38 supra.
344. The issue whether the burden of proof should be placed upon defendants in crim-
inal cases on defenses such as excuse, mitigation, self-defense, and alibi has received exten-
sive treatment in the literature because of some landmark Supreme Court cases. See, e.g.,
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S.* 197 (1977) (state need not disprove beyond a reasonable
doubt every element that constitutes an affirmative defense); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.
684 (1975) (state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of a crime); Leland
v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952) (due diligence is an affirmative defense, not an element of a
crime, and a statute that requires defendant to prove the defense by a preponderance of the
evidence is not unconstitutional). See also Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and
Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALig L.J. 1325 (1979); Nesson, Reasonable Doubt
and Permissive Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92 HAnv. L. REV. 1187 (1979); Under-
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As particular circumstances arise that require evaluation of
the ordinary allocation of the burden of proof, courts do not hesi-
tate to place the burden where it should lie to prevent injustice.
The landmark case of Summers v. Tice,3" for example, is an in-
stance in which a court effectuated a social policy through a proce-
dural rule. Plaintiff, while hunting for quail on the open range with
the two defendants, was struck in the right eye by birdshots from
the gunshot of one of the defendants. Both defendants had fired in
plaintiff's direction at essentially the same time; both had twelve
gauge shotguns using seven and a half size shot; and, under the
circumstances, both were negligent. In affirming the judgment
against both defendants, the California Supreme Court unani-
mously based its conclusion upon the theory that, under these cir-
cumstances, the burden of proof shifted to the defendants-that it
rested with each one of them "to absolve himself if he can. '3 46
Other courts have applied this principle in other situations, al-
though they have not always characterized it as such.u4
The allocation of the burdens of proof suggested in this Article
is consistent with the considerations of policy, fairness, and
probability that courts have relied upon in other kinds of cases.
The proposed framework provides a generally more efficient and
equitable method for deciding discrimination cases. First, the pro-
posal requires the plaintiff to produce a specified quantum of evi-
dence to establish a prima facie case under one of the substantive
theories of discrimination 4' The approach then requires rigorous
judicial scrutiny under the affirmative defense doctrine of the jus-
tification that a defendant offers to explain his conduct. Although
the courts have attempted to formulate objectively the quantum of
wood, supra note 9; Note, Affirmative Defenses and Due Process: The Constitutionality of
Placing a Burden of Persuasion on a Criminal Defendant, 54 GEo. L.J. 871 (1976).
345. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
346. Id. at 88, 199 P.2d at 5. See also Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687
(1944).
347. Cf. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 101 S. Ct. 1571 (1981)
(employer not entitled to contribution from union even though union was a party to a col-
lective bargaining agreement found to be discriminatory). See generally Dworkin, supra
note 38.
348. Despite the three-step order of proof suggested in McDonnell Douglas and
Furnco, a plaintiff still must make a complete presentation at the initial stage of litigation
or risk dismissal. For decisions which hold that a court need not examine alleged discrimina-
tory conduct unless the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, see Moore v. Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Sime v. Trustees of the Cal. State




proof necessary to establish a prima facie case under the disparate
impact and disparate treatment theories in the statutory discrimi-
nation cases, they have been unable to reach a consensus. They
also have made similar efforts to establish consistent standards for
the defense of business necessity.
To treat a prima facie case as a presumption is preferable to
treating it as an inference because the former arrangement firmly
fixes the quantum of evidence necessary to establish a prima facie
case and provides a workable standard for the factfinder. These
objectives are markedly lacking under the inference approach, and
courts frequently have noted that the decision to draw the infer-
ence is a discretionary matter. 49 Because an inference analysis
leaves the ultimate finding of discrimination-and the determina-
tion of intent-entirely to the factfinder, findings of discrimination
and intent inevitably are subject to severely limited and ineffective
appellate review. 50 The presumption approach to the prima facie
case, on the other hand, allows for a more objective standard of
review and diminishes the possibility that trial courts will reach
unpredictable and widely divergent results.
Characterizing a prima facie case as a presumption pinpoints
the threshold at which the burdens of proof shift to the defendant
to plead, produce evidence, and persuade. It also helps ensure that
all relevant evidence is presented to the factfnder. Once the plain-
tiff has presented to the court the threshold of evidence necessary
to establish a prima facie case on the issue of intent, for example,
the difficulty of producing further evidence to rebut an erroneous
presumption justifies requiring the defendant to prove that the in-
tent to discriminate was not among the considerations which moti-
vated his conduct. Courts have long acknowledged the policy that
the burden of proof should be placed upon the party who presuma-
bly has the peculiar means of access to the evidence necessary to
prove a disputed fact.3 51 A defendant who relies upon a statutory
defense or a judicially created defense is certainly in a better posi-
tion to disclose the motivation guiding his decision than a plaintiff
who has suffered the effect of that decision. The proposed frame-
work thus is an attempt to distribute the burden of proof equitably
between opposing parties.
349. See note 133 supra.
350. See authorities cited note 208 supra.




The laws that prohibit discrimination are based in substantial
part upon the proposition that decisions about members of a pro-
tected class are affected to varying degrees by assumptions and
stereotypes that are unrelated to ability.3 52 Thus, a danger exists
that when a decisionmaker is confronted with a member of a pro-
tected class, his determination will not be based upon an unbiased
economic self-interest. The remedial antidiscrimination statutes
provide a further reason to suspect that decisions which disadvan-
tage individuals within any of the protected classes may be based
upon prohibited criteria.3"
On more than one occasion, the Supreme Court has noted that
those individuals to whom the discrimination laws apply have an
important role to play in effectuating the national policy against
discrimination, and that the courts also play a critical role by pro-
viding appropriate standards to ensure that these individuals do
not shun their duty. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,5 " for ex-
ample, the Court stated,
If employers faced only the prospect of an injunctive order, they would have
little incentive to shun practices of dubious legality. It is the reasonably cer-
tain prospect of a backpay award that "provide[s] the spur or catalyst which
causes employers... to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment
practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of
an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country's history."
'361
On another occasion, the Court noted that "the ability of the union
and employer voluntarily to modify the seniority system to the end
of ameliorating the effects of past racial discrimination, a national
policy objective of the 'highest priority,' is certainly no less than in
352. See Fiss, supra note 5, at 241.
353. In commenting on discrimination prohibited under Title VII, Judge Tuttle noted
that
[r]acial discrimination in employment is one of the most deplorable forms of discrimi-
nation known to our society, for it deals not with just an individual's sharing in the
"outer benefits" of being an American citizen, but rather the ability to provide decently
for one's family in a job or profession for which he qualifies and chooses. Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act provides us with a clear mandate from Congress that no
longer will the United States tolerate this form of discrimination. It is, therefore, the
duty of the courts to make sure that the Act works, and the intent of Congress is not
hampered by a combination of a strict construction of the statute and a battle with
semantics.
Culpepper v. Reynolds Metal Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970) (citation omitted).
354. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).




other areas of public policy interests." '
The proposed framework suggested by this Article for the allo-
cation of burdens of proof furthers the national policy against dis-
crimination. It requires those subject to regulation to examine and
evaluate their policies and practices in the interest of avoiding
both intended and unintended discriminatory consequences that
might be embedded in their institutional and organizational prac-
tices. Each time that a decisionmaker makes a determination
about a member of a protected class, he must recognize the poten-
tial legal consequences that might follow if a lawsuit is brought
against him. 57 Under the proposal that is suggested, the defendant
would face the prospect of having to legitimate his decision by a
preponderance of the evidence.
While neither the laws that prohibit discrimination nor their
legislative histories expressly provide for preferential treatment of
protected class members, this concept is implicit in the enactment
of laws prohibiting discriminations58 and provides greater justifica-
tion for the framework proposed by this Article. When a protected
class member suffers an adverse determination at the hands of a
decisionmaker, an impermissible criterion indirectly may have
been a factor, even if the decisionmaker arguably made his deter-
mination on a facially neutral criterion, since the criterion may
well reflect present effects of past discrimination.
The conflict over the most efficient procedure for proving the
existence of a fact reflects a fundamental disagreement over the
ultimate substantive issue of what constitutes discrimination. At
the heart of this dispute is a policy judgment on the degree of re-
sponsibility that the defendants should bear for the present effects
of past societal discrimination. This dispute also is reflected in the
causation principle; it can be characterized as a fight over "blame"
and "responsibility." "Blame" connotes individual culpability for
illicit motivations that are not decisive factors for imposing liabil-
ity. "Responsibility"-or the lack thereof-on the other hand, im-
plies that a legal obligation has been breached.5 9 The proposed
356. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 779 (1976) (footnote omitted).
357. See, e.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978); Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308 (1975) (establishing the duty to know the settled law as an element of the qualified
immunity defense in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
358. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Belton, supra note
2.
359. See generally Black, Civil Rights in Times of Economic Stress-Jurisprudential
and Philosophic Aspects, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 559, 565.
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framework imposes obligations upon defendants to conduct their
businesses in a manner that mitigates the societal problems of dis-
crimination, or, at the very least, to refrain from engaging in a
decisionmaking process that perpetuates its evils.3 60 Allocating the
burdens in the manner suggested by this Article imposes upon the
plaintiff the obligation to evaluate critically a claim of discrimina-
tion under the prima facie case doctrine;"8 1 it also imposes upon




The foregoing discussion has analyzed the mechanisms for
making a determination of discrimination from a procedural per-
spective. It has developed a framework of rules that may assist the
courts in allocating the burdens of pleading, producing evidence,
and persuasion-in accordance with basic principles of policy, fair-
ness, and probability. The complexity of the decisionmaking pro-
cess in American society and its industrial organization preclude
an easy answer to the resolution of discrimination claims. Never-
theless, if the broad national policy against discrimination is to be
promoted, feasible methods must be formulated for making this
determination.
360. See id. at 565-71.
361. The penalty imposed upon plaintiffs who bring frivolous lawsuits is an award of
attorneys fees, in addition to costs. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412
(1978).
362. See generally Belton, supra note 2.
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